

Optimal monetary policy, asset purchases, and credit market frictions¹

Andreas Schabert²

University of Cologne

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Abstract

We examine how credit market frictions affect optimal monetary policy and if central bank asset purchases can enhance welfare. We develop a sticky price model where money serves as the means of payment and ex-ante identical agents borrow/lend among each other. The credit market is distorted as borrowing is constrained by available collateral. We show that the central bank cannot implement the first best allocation and that optimal monetary policy mainly aims at stabilizing prices. We find that the central bank can stimulate private lending and enhance welfare by purchasing loans at a favorable price, which relies on rationing money supply.

JEL classification: E4; E5; E32.

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²University of Cologne, Center for Macroeconomic Research, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany, Phone: +49 221 470 2483, Email: schabert@wiso.uni-koeln.de.

1 Introduction

How should monetary policy be conducted under credit market frictions? In this paper, we examine how borrowing constraints affect the trade-off of a central bank that aims at maximizing welfare of a representative agent (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010 for an overview). We develop a macroeconomic model where prices are sticky and money serves as a mean of payment. Private agents can differ with regard to their willingness to spend, giving rise to borrowing/lending between ex-ante identical agents, while borrowing is constrained by available collateral. We analyze how monetary policy affects private borrowing/lending, and how the central bank conducts optimal policy depending on the tightness of the borrowing constraint. We further show that the central bank can enhance welfare by easing the latter via purchases of secured loans, providing a rationale for central bank purchases of credit market instruments during the recent financial crisis.³ Specifically, for loan purchases to be welfare enhancing the central bank has to offer a favorable price, implying that money supply will be effectively rationed in equilibrium.

We apply a simple business cycle model where money is essential and private agents borrow/lend among each other. To facilitate aggregation, we consider ex-ante identical agents, as in Shi (1997). In each period, they draw preference shocks from the same time-invariant distribution, i.e. shocks that shift their valuation of the consumption good. Private agents with a high valuation of consumption are willing to consume more, for which they borrow money from other agents. We assume that contract enforcement is limited, such that lending relies on the borrower's ability to pledge collateral, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Likewise, we assume that the central bank supplies money only against eligible assets, for which we consider treasury securities as collateral in open market operations. We further account for the possibility of central bank purchases of secured loans. To be more precise, the central bank might temporarily hold secured loans under repurchase agreements (which differs from outright purchases as recently conducted by US Federal Reserve, see e.g. Hancock and Passmore, 2014).

Loans are assumed to be intraperiod, as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012), which implies that real debt burden cannot be reduced by higher inflation.⁴ In this framework, higher inflation is not beneficial for borrowers since it tends to increase the nominal lending rate and thereby amplifies the credit market friction. For the analysis of optimal policy, we assume that the central bank acts under full commitment (while we neglect the issue of time inconsistency, as usual in the literature). Specifically, it aims at maximizing welfare of a representative agent, taking into account that prices are imperfectly flexible, money is costly, and borrowing is constrained. We find

³Asset purchases considered in this model are related to the type of policies introduced by the US Federal Reserve during the financial crisis before 2010, which have also been characterized by "credit easing" (see Bernanke, 2009).

⁴This differs from studies on optimal policy under financial market frictions with intertemporal nominal debt (see Monacelli, 2008, or De Fiore et al., 2011).

that monetary policy cannot implement first best, regardless of price flexibility, since distortions due to costs of money holdings and due to the borrowing constraint cannot simultaneously be eliminated by the central bank. We first examine a conventional monetary policy regime, where access to central bank money is not effectively constrained by holdings of eligible assets. In this case, central bank asset purchases are neutral and there is a single monetary policy instrument. Under reasonable degrees of price rigidity, we find that an optimizing central bank mainly aims at stabilizing prices, which accords to the results in the literature on optimal monetary policy in sticky price models (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010). If prices were more flexible, the central bank is willing to reduce the inflation rate, which tends to reduce the loan rate and, thereby, to ease the credit market friction.

We then account for additional instruments that might be applied by the central bank by supplying money in a way that induces asset purchases to be effective. Specifically, purchases of loans are non-neutral if the central bank offers a price that is more favorable than the market price, which is only possible if it simultaneously rations the amount of money supplied. For this, it restricts the set of assets eligible for central bank operations such that money cannot be acquired in an unbounded way (which is typically assumed in macroeconomic theory). By purchasing secured loans at a favorable price, i.e. at a rate below lender's marginal valuation of money, lenders have an incentive to refinance secured loans and to use the proceeds to extend lending. Central bank loan purchases can thereby induce lenders to charge a lower loan rate, which tends to stimulate private sector borrowing. Compared to the conventional (single instrument) specification of optimal monetary policy where money is supplied in a non-rationed way, we find that the central bank can thereby enhance welfare of the representative agent.⁵ This is demonstrated by showing that a (non-optimizing) central bank can alleviate the distortion induced by the borrowing constraint by purchasing a large share of secured loans below the market price. We further show that an optimizing monetary policy can even undo the credit market friction by loan purchases in the case where the borrowing constraint is not too tight (i.e. where the liquidation value of collateral is sufficiently large), implying that the effectiveness of asset purchases does not rely on the severity of the credit market friction. However, the welfare gains and the scope of effective asset purchases are endogenously limited by the valuation of money and by restrictions on policy instruments (like the zero lower bound on interest rates).

The paper relates to studies on optimal monetary policy in sticky price models (see Kahn et al., 2003, or Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010) and under financial market frictions, for example, to Monacelli (2008), who examines optimal monetary policy when borrowing households face a

⁵The possibility to enhance welfare by rationing money supply is shown by Schabert (2013) in a framework with frictionless financial markets.

collateral constraint, or to De Fiore et al. (2011), who analyze optimal monetary policy under flexible prices and imperfect monitoring. The central bank asset purchase analysis relates to studies on unconventional monetary policies like Curdia and Woodford (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), who find that direct central bank lending under costly financial intermediation can be effective if financial market frictions are sufficiently large. The analysis in this paper further relates to Araújo et al. (2013), who show in a model with endogenous collateral constraints and without a special role of currency that central bank purchases of collateral at market prices can potentially improve welfare, though they tend to lower welfare when purchases are sufficiently large. Applying an estimated model with segmented asset markets, Chen et al. (2012) find that large scale asset purchases as recently conducted by the US Federal Reserve can lead to small expansionary effects even at the zero lower bound.

In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3, we demonstrate how the credit market friction affects the long-run equilibrium and how its severity is altered by monetary policy. In Section 4, we examine optimal monetary policy considering a regime without money rationing and a regime where money supply is effectively rationed. Section 5 concludes.

2 The model

In this Section, we provide an overview of the model, present the details of the private sector behavior and the public sector, and describe the first best allocation.

2.1 Overview

There are three sectors: households, firms, and the public sector. Households consists of members who enter a period with money and government bonds and dispose of a constant time endowment. They can further hold a durable good, i.e. housing, which is supplied at a fixed amount. At the beginning of each period, aggregate productivity shocks are realized and open market operations are conducted, where the central bank sells or purchases assets outright or supplies money via repos against eligible assets at the policy rate R_t^m . Then, idiosyncratic preference shocks are realized.⁶ Household members with a high realization of the preference shock (ϵ_b) are willing to consume more than household members with a low realization of the preference shock ($\epsilon_l < \epsilon_b$). Given that purchases of consumption goods rely on money holdings, the former borrow money from the latter at the price $1/R_t^L$. Loan contracts are assumed not to be perfectly enforceable, such that loans they are collateralized by the market value of borrowers' housing. These secured loans might be purchased by the central bank, such that the proceeds are available to extend credit supply. After

⁶The assumption that preference shocks are realized after money is supplied in open market operations against treasuries is made only to facilitate the analysis for the case where money is supplied in a non-rationed way, which is equivalent to the conventional specification where money is supplied via lump-sum transfers.

goods are produced, the market for consumption goods opens, where money serves as the means of payment, inducing demand for money and assets eligible for open market operations. In the asset market, borrowing agents repay the secured loans, the government issues new bonds at the price $1/R_t$, and the central bank reinvests payoffs from maturing bonds and leaves money supply unchanged.⁷

The central bank sets the price of money (i.e. the policy rate), decides on how much money is supplied against eligible assets in open market operations and by purchases of loans, and it transfers interest earnings to the treasury. The government issues risk-free bonds, which back private sector money holdings, and has access to lump-sum taxes. Firms produce goods employing labor from households, and they set prices in an imperfectly flexible way.

2.2 Details

Households There are infinitely many households of measure one. Each household has a unit measure of members i . Following Shi (1997), we assume that assets of all household members are equally distributed at the beginning of each period. Their utility increases with consumption $c_{i,t}$ of a non-durable good and holdings of a durable good, i.e. housing $h_{i,t}$, and is decreasing in working time $n_{i,t}$. Like in Iacoviello (2005), we assume that the supply of housing is fixed at h . Members of each household can differ with regard to their marginal valuation of consumption due to preference shocks $\epsilon_i > 0$, which are i.i.d. across members and time. The instantaneous utility function of ex-ante identical members is given by

$$u(c_{i,t}, h_{i,t}, n_{i,t}, \epsilon_{i,t}) = \epsilon_{i,t}(c_{i,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1)(1 - \sigma)^{-1} + \gamma(h_{i,t}^{1-\sigma_h} - 1)(1 - \sigma_h)^{-1} - \chi n_{i,t}^{1+\eta}(1 + \eta)^{-1}, \quad (1)$$

where $\sigma_{(h)} > 0$, $\gamma > 0$, $\chi > 0$, and $\eta \geq 0$ and $h_{i,t}$ denotes the end-of-period stock of housing, which might differ between both types of members. For simplicity, we assume that ϵ_i exhibits two possible realizations, $\epsilon_i \in \{\epsilon_b, \epsilon_l\}$, with equal probabilities $\pi_\epsilon = 0.5$, where $\epsilon_l < \epsilon_b$. Household members rely on money for purchases of consumption goods. For this, they hold money $M_{i,t-1}^H$ and can acquire additional money $I_{i,t}$ from the central bank, for which they hold eligible assets, in particular, treasury securities. Household members can further acquire money $I_{i,t}$ from the central bank in open market operations, where money is supplied against treasury securities discounted with the policy rate R_t^m :

$$I_{i,t} \leq \kappa_t^B B_{i,t-1}/R_t^m. \quad (2)$$

Thus, the central bank supplies money against fractions of (randomly selected) bonds $\kappa_t^B \geq 0$ (see 2). When household member i draws the realization ϵ_b (ϵ_l), which materializes after treasuries can

⁷Further details on the flow of funds within each period can be found in Schabert (2013), where a corresponding framework without credit market frictions is applied.

be liquidated in open market operations,⁸ it is willing to consume more (less) than members who draw ϵ_l (ϵ_b). Hence, ϵ_b -type members tend to borrow an additional amount of money from ϵ_l -type members.

We assume that borrowing and lending among private agents only takes place in form of short-term loans at the price $1/R_t^L$. As Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we assume that loan contracts are signed at the beginning of the period and repaid at the end of each period, which greatly simplifies the analysis.⁹ We account for the fact that debt repayment cannot always be guaranteed and debt contracts cannot be perfectly enforced. We assume that loans are – at least partially – secured by borrowers’ holdings of housing, serving as collateral. Specifically, ϵ_b -type members borrow the amount $L_{b,t} < 0$ up the liquidation value of collateral at maturity

$$-L_{b,t} \leq z_t P_t q_t h_{b,t}, \quad (3)$$

where q_t denotes the real housing price, and z_t a stochastic liquidation value of collateral (see Iacoviello, 2005). We consider not only for secured loans, but further account for the possibility of borrowers to issue further debt, measured as a share $v \geq 0$ of the secured loans. This debt can be interpreted as not being fully collateralized, such that private borrowing/lending takes place both in form of unsecured and secured lending (as in He et al., 2013).

We allow for the possibility that the central bank purchases loans. Specifically, after the preference shocks are realized and loan contract are signed, lenders can refinance secured loans $L_{l,t}$, but not the unsecured loans $vL_{l,t}$, at the central bank, which purchases a randomly selected fraction $\kappa_t \geq 0$ of loans at the price $1/R_t^m$:

$$I_{l,t}^L \leq \kappa_t L_{l,t} / R_t^m \quad (4)$$

where $I_{l,t}^L \geq 0$.¹⁰ Money $I_{l,t}^L$ received from loan purchases, $\kappa_t > 0$, can be used for further lending. Thus, by purchasing loans the central bank can influence the lenders’ valuation of secured loans and can increase the amount of money that is available for credit supply. For simplicity, we assume that loan purchases are conducted in form of repurchase agreements, i.e. loans are repurchased by lenders before they mature (such that lending agents earn the interest on loans).

In the goods market, member i can then use money holdings M_{t-1}^H as well as new injections $I_{i,t}$ and $I_{l,t}^L$ plus/minus loans for consumption expenditures. Hence, the goods market constraints

⁸Note that this assumption is only relevant for the case, where money is supplied in a non-rationed way.

⁹Given that loans are traded within a period, private sector debt is not directly affected by inflation.

¹⁰A value of κ_t that exceeds one can in principle be interpreted as purchases at a price that is even more favorable than the price of money in terms of treasuries (see 2).

for the lender and the borrower read

$$P_t c_{l,t} \leq I_{l,t} + I_{l,t}^L + M_{l,t-1}^H - [(1+v)L_{l,t} + L_{l,t}^r] / R_t^L, \quad (5)$$

$$P_t c_{b,t} \leq I_{b,t} + M_{b,t-1}^H - [(1+v)L_{b,t} + L_{b,t}^r] / R_t^L, \quad (6)$$

where $L_{l,t}^r$ denotes loans funded by the proceeds of central bank purchases, $L_{l,t}^r/R_t^L \leq I_{l,t}^L$ and $L_{l,t}^r = -L_{b,t}^r$. Notably, loans that are refinanced by the central bank $L_{l,t}^r$ or the private sector $vL_{l,t}$ are not (fully) secured and are assumed not to be eligible for central bank operations.

Before, the asset market opens, wages, taxes, and profits are paid, and repos are settled, i.e. agents buy back loans and bonds from the central bank. In the asset market, members repay intraperiod loans and invest in treasuries. Thus, the asset market constraint of both types of members is

$$\begin{aligned} M_{i,t-1}^H + B_{i,t-1} + (1+v)L_{i,t}(1-1/R_t^L) + L_{i,t}^r(1-1/R_t^L) + P_t w_t n_{i,t} + P_t \delta_{i,t} + P_t \tau_{i,t} & (7) \\ \geq M_{i,t}^H + (B_{i,t}/R_t) + (I_{i,t} + I_{i,t}^L)(R_t^m - 1) + P_t c_{i,t} + P_t q_t (h_{i,t} - h_{i,t-1}), & \end{aligned}$$

where $I_{b,t}^L = 0$ and $q_t = P_{h,t}/P_t$ and $P_{h,t}$ is the nominal price of housing. Maximizing $E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u_{i,t}$ subject to (2), (4), (5), (7), and the borrowing constraints (3), $-L_{bt}^r \leq I_{l,t}^L R_t^L$, $M_{i,t}^H \geq 0$, and $B_{i,t} \geq 0$, leads to the following first order conditions for consumption, working time, holdings of treasuries and money, and additional money from open market operations $\forall i \in \{b, l\}$

$$\epsilon_{i,t} c_{i,t}^{-\sigma} = \lambda_{i,t} + \psi_{i,t}, \quad (8)$$

$$\chi n_{i,t}^\eta = w_t \lambda_{i,t}, \quad (9)$$

$$\lambda_{i,t} = \beta R_t E_t [(\lambda_{i,t+1} + \kappa_{t+1}^B \eta_{i,t+1}) / \pi_{t+1}], \quad (10)$$

$$\lambda_{i,t} = \beta E_t [(\lambda_{i,t+1} + \psi_{i,t+1}) / \pi_{t+1}], \quad (11)$$

$$(\pi_\epsilon \psi_{b,t} + \pi_\epsilon \psi_{l,t}) = (R_t^m - 1)(\pi_\epsilon \lambda_{b,t} + \pi_\epsilon \lambda_{l,t}) + R_t^m \eta_{i,t}, \quad (12)$$

where $\lambda_{i,t} \geq 0$ is the multiplier on the asset market constraint (7), $\eta_{i,t} \geq 0$ the multiplier on the collateral constraint (2), and $\psi_{i,t} \geq 0$ the multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint (5). The cash-constraint implies – for $\psi_{i,t} > 0$ – the usual distortion regarding the optimal choices for consumption and working time (see 8 and 9). Condition (10) indicates that the interest rate on government bonds might be reduced by a liquidity premium, stemming from the possibility to exchange a fraction κ_t^B of bonds in open market operations.

Given that household members are ex-ante identical, their expected valuation of payoffs in the subsequent period are identical, implying that $\lambda_{b,t} = \lambda_{l,t} = \beta E_t \frac{\epsilon_{i,t+1} c_{i,t+1}^{-\sigma}}{\pi_{t+1}}$ (see 11) and that both types supply the same amount of working time, $n_{b,t}^\eta = n_{l,t}^\eta = (w_t/\chi) \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_{bc,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_{lc,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}]$ (see 9). Condition (8) for money supplied against treasuries, which indicates that idiosyncratic

shocks are not revealed before open market operations are conducted, then simplifies to $0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma})/R_t^m = \lambda_{i,t} + \eta_{i,t}$. Thus, the money supply constraint in (2) is further binding if the multiplier $\eta_{i,t}$ satisfies $\eta_{i,t} = 0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma})/R_t^m - \beta E_t[0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}] > 0$ (see 8, 11, and 12). For this, the policy rate has to be lower than the average member's marginal (nominal) rate of intertemporal substitution, $R_t^m < [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma})]/[\beta E_t 0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}]$.¹¹

Further, the following type specific first order conditions for loans, housing, money from loan purchases $I_{l,t}^L$, and refinanced loans $L_{b,t}^r$ have to be satisfied

$$\psi_{l,t} = \lambda_{l,t} (R_t^L - 1) + R_t^L \kappa_t \varsigma_{l,t} / (1 + \nu), \quad \text{and} \quad \psi_{b,t} = \lambda_{b,t} (R_t^L - 1) + \zeta_{b,t} R_t^L / (1 + \nu), \quad (13)$$

$$q_t \lambda_{b,t} = \gamma h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h} + \zeta_{b,t} z_t q_t + \beta E_t q_{t+1} \lambda_{i,t+1}, \quad \text{and} \quad q_t \lambda_{l,t} = \gamma h_{l,t}^{-\sigma_h} + \beta E_t q_{t+1} \lambda_{i,t+1}, \quad (14)$$

$$\varsigma_{l,t} = \lambda_{l,t} (R_t^L - R_t^m) / R_t^m, \quad \text{and} \quad \varkappa_{b,t} R_t^L = \psi_{b,t} - \lambda_{b,t} (R_t^L - 1), \quad (15)$$

where $\varsigma_{l,t}$ denotes the multiplier on the money supply constraint (4), $\zeta_{i,t}$ the multiplier on the borrowing constraint (3), and $\varkappa_{b,t}$ the multiplier on the constraint $-L_{b,t}^r \leq I_{l,t}^L R_t^L$. Further, the associated complementary slackness conditions and the transversality conditions hold. The conditions for loan demand and supply in (13) reveal that the credit market allocation can be affected by central bank loan purchases (for $\varsigma_{l,t} > 0$) and by the borrowing constraint (for $\zeta_{b,t} > 0$). The borrower demand loans according to $(\psi_{b,t} + \lambda_{b,t}) / R_t^L = \lambda_{b,t} + \zeta_{b,t} / (1 + \nu)$ (see 13), which can by using (8) and (11) be rewritten as

$$\frac{1}{R_t^L} = \beta E_t \frac{0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})}{\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} \pi_{t+1}} + \frac{\zeta_{b,t}}{\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} (1 + \nu)}. \quad (16)$$

Hence, a positive multiplier $\zeta_{b,t}$ tends – for a given R_t^L – to raise the RHS of (16), implying that current consumption tends to fall, which can be mitigated by a lower loan rate. Put differently, a binding borrowing constraint tends to reduce the loan rate below the borrowers' marginal rate of intertemporal substitution $1/\beta E_t[0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/(\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} \pi_{t+1})]$. The distortion due to the borrowing constraint (3) is obviously less pronounced for a higher share ν of unsecured loans. The lender supplies loans according to $\lambda_{l,t} + \varsigma_{l,t} \kappa_t / (1 + \nu) = (\psi_{l,t} + \lambda_{l,t}) / R_t^L$ (see 13), or – using (8) and (11) – to $\beta E_t \frac{0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})}{\pi_{t+1}} + \varsigma_{l,t} \kappa_t / (1 + \nu) = \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} / R_t^L$. Eliminating the multiplier $\varsigma_{l,t}$ with (15), then leads to

$$\frac{1}{R_t^L} = \beta E_t \frac{0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})}{\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} \pi_{t+1}} \left[1 + \frac{\kappa_t}{1 + \nu} \left(\frac{R_t^L}{R_t^m} - 1 \right) \right]. \quad (17)$$

Condition (17) implies that the loan rate is affected by the lender's marginal rate of intertemporal

¹¹It should be noted that the average member's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution $0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma})/[\beta E_t 0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}]$ is typically larger than the lender's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution $\epsilon_{l,t} c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} / [\beta E_t 0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}]$ when the borrowing constraint is binding.

substitution in nominal terms $1/\beta E_t[0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/(\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} \pi_{t+1})]$ as well as by the policy rate R_t^m , if the central bank purchases loans, $\kappa_t > 0$.

The borrowing constraint further distorts the borrower's demand for housing and thus the housing price q_t (see 14). Combining the first order conditions for housing (14) gives $\gamma(h_{l,t}^{-\sigma h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma h}) = \zeta_{b,t} q_t z_t$. Hence, if the collateral constraint is binding $\zeta_{b,t} > 0$, investments in housing differ between both types of members, i.e. $h_{b,t} > h_{l,t}$. Combining the conditions in (13) and substituting out $\lambda_{i,t} + \psi_{i,t}$ with (8), further leads to

$$\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} - \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} = R_t^L (\zeta_{b,t} - R_t^L \kappa_t \varsigma_{l,t}) / (1 + \nu) \quad (18)$$

which implies that the consumption choice (that would ideally satisfy $\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} - \epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} = 0$, see Proposition 1) is distorted by the borrowing constraint ($\zeta_{b,t} > 0$) and by the possibility that loans can be liquidated at the central bank ($\varsigma_{l,t} > 0$). This further implies that the central bank can in principle undo the effects of the borrowing constraint by purchasing loans, $\kappa_t > 0$.

Conditions (13) and (15) imply $\varkappa_{b,t} = \zeta_{b,t}/(1 + \nu)$, which shows that borrowers demand the maximum amount of refinanced loans ($\varkappa_{b,t} > 0 \Rightarrow -L_{b,t}^r = I_{l,t}^L R_t^L$) when the borrowing constraint is binding ($\zeta_{b,t} > 0$). The money supply constraint (4) will further be binding, $\varsigma_{l,t} > 0$, implying that lenders are willing to refinance loans at the central bank when this allows to extract further rents, i.e. if the policy rate is lower than the loan rate (see 15). Lenders will then refinance the maximum amount of available loans and use these funds to supply further loans, $L_{l,t}^r/R_t^L = I_{l,t}^L$. If, however, the policy rate is equal or larger than the loan rate, $R_t^m \geq R_t^L$, lenders have no incentive to refinance loans at the central bank, and lenders do not engage in further lending, $L_{l,t}^r = 0$. Thus, only if $R_t^m < R_t^L$ (and thus $\varsigma_{l,t} > 0$) the central bank can influence the loan rate independently of the inflation rate by purchasing loans, $\kappa_t > 0$. It should finally be noted that $R_t^m < R_t^L$ implies that the policy rate is also lower than the lender's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution $\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma}/[\beta E_t 0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}]$ (see 17), which will – under a binding borrowing constraint – be sufficient for the money supply constraint (2) to be binding, $\eta_{i,t} > 0$. Given that money supply is then effectively constrained by the available amount of eligible assets, i.e. bonds and secured loans, this type of monetary policy implies money rationing.

Firms There is a continuum of identical intermediate goods producing firms indexed with $j \in [0, 1]$. They exist for one period, are perfectly competitive, and are owned by the households. A firm j distributes profits to the owners and hires the aggregate labor input $n_{j,t}$ at a common rate w_t . It then produces the intermediate good according to $x_{j,t} = a_t n_{j,t}^\alpha$, where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and a_t is stochastic with an unconditional mean equal to one, and sells it to retailers. Following related studies (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010), we allow for a constant subsidy τ^p to eliminate long-run distortions, such that the problem of a profit-maximizing firm j is given by

$\max(1 + \tau^p)P_{J,t}a_t n_{j,t}^\alpha - P_t w_t n_{j,t}$, where $P_{J,t}$ denotes the price for the intermediate good. The first order conditions are given by $(1 + \tau^p)(P_{J,t}/P_t)\alpha n_{j,t}^{1-\alpha} = w_t$ or $(P_{J,t}/P_t)a_t \alpha n_{j,t}^{\alpha-1} = (1 - \tau^n)$, where we defined $\tau^n = \tau^p/(1 + \tau^p)$ as the production (or wage) subsidy rate. The firms transfer profits to the owners in a lump-sum way.

To introduce sticky prices, we assume that there are monopolistically competitive retailers who re-package intermediate goods $x_t = \int_0^1 x_{j,t} dj$. A retailer $k \in [0, 1]$ produces one unit of a distinct good $y_{k,t}$ with one unit of the intermediate good (purchased at the common price $P_{J,t}$) and sells it at the price $P_{k,t}$ to perfectly competitive bundlers. They bundle the distinct goods $y_{k,t}$ to a final good $y_t = (\int_0^1 y_{k,t}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} dk)^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$ which is sold at the price P_t . The cost minimizing demand for $y_{k,t}$ is then given by $y_{k,t} = (P_{k,t}/P_t)^{-\varepsilon} y_t$. We assume that each period a measure $1 - \phi$ of randomly selected retailers may reset their prices independently of the time elapsed since the last price setting, while a fraction $\phi \in [0, 1)$ of retailers do not adjust their prices. A fraction $1 - \phi$ of retailers sets their price to maximize the expected sum of discounted future profits. For $\phi > 0$, the first order condition for their price \tilde{P}_t can be written as $Z_{1,t}/Z_{2,t} = \tilde{Z}_t(\varepsilon - 1)/\varepsilon$, where $Z_{1,t} = (1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha)0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} s_t^{-1} + \phi\beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^\varepsilon Z_{1,t+1}$, $Z_{2,t} = (1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha)0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} (mc_t s_t)^{-1} + \phi\beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^{\varepsilon-1} Z_{2,t+1}$, $\tilde{Z}_t = \tilde{P}_t/P_t$, and $mc_t = P_{J,t}/P_t$ denotes retailers' real marginal cost. With perfectly competitive bundlers, the price index P_t for the final good satisfies $P_t^{1-\varepsilon} = \int_0^1 P_{k,t}^{1-\varepsilon} dk$. Using that $\int_0^1 P_{k,t}^{1-\varepsilon} dk = (1 - \phi) \sum_{s=0}^\infty \phi^s \tilde{P}_{t-s}^{1-\varepsilon}$ holds, and taking differences, leads to $1 = (1 - \phi)(\tilde{Z}_t)^{1-\varepsilon} + \phi\pi_t^{\varepsilon-1}$.

Public sector The government is assumed to issue one-period nominally risk-free bonds at the price $1/R_t$, pays lump-sum transfers or raises lump-sum taxes, and a wage subsidy at a constant rate, while we abstract from government spending, distortionary taxation, and issuance of long-term debt, for simplicity. The supply of government bonds, which are either held by households or the central bank, is further assumed to be exogenous to the state of the economy, like in Shi (2013). Specifically, we assume that the total amount of short-term government bonds B_t^T grows the rate $\Gamma > 0$,

$$B_t^T = \Gamma B_{t-1}^T, \quad (19)$$

given $B_{-1}^T > 0$. Due to the existence of lump-sum transfers/taxes, which balance the budget, we will be able to abstract from fiscal policy, except for the supply of bonds (19). Note that the growth rate might affect the long-run inflation rate if the money supply constraint (2) is binding. In Appendix A.4, we show how the central bank can nevertheless implement a desired inflation target by long-run adjustments of its instruments. The government further pays a constant wage subsidy τ^p , which is solely introduced to eliminate average distortions from imperfect competitive (as usual in related studies, see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010) and receives seigniorage revenues τ_t^m from the central bank, such that its budget constraint reads $(B_t^T/R_t) + P_t \tau_t^m = B_{t-1}^T + P_t \tau_t + P_t \tau^p$.

The central bank supplies money in open market operations either outright or temporarily via repos against treasuries, $M_t^H = \int_0^1 M_{i,t}^H di$ and $M_t^R = \int_0^1 M_{i,t}^R di$. It can further increase the supply of money by purchasing secured loans from lenders, $M_t^L = I_t^L$, i.e. it conducts repos where secured loans serve as collateral. At the beginning of each period, its stock of treasuries equals B_{t-1}^c and the stock of outstanding money equals M_{t-1}^H . It then receives treasuries and loans in exchange for money. Before the asset market opens, where the central bank rolls over maturing assets, repos in terms of treasuries and secured loans are settled. Hence, the central bank issues money and holds only government bonds such that its budget constraint reads

$$(B_t^c/R_t) - B_{t-1}^c + P_t \tau_t^m = R_t^m (M_t^H - M_{t-1}^H) + (R_t^m - 1) (M_t^L + M_t^R), \quad (20)$$

while it earns interest from holding bonds and by supplying money at the price $1/R_t^m$. We assume that the central bank transfers its interest earnings from asset holdings and from open market operations to the treasury, $P_t \tau_t^m = (1 - 1/R_t) B_t^c + R_t^m (M_t^H - M_{t-1}^H) + (R_t^m - 1) (M_t^L + M_t^R)$. Thus, its budget constraint (20) implies that central bank asset holdings evolve according to $B_t^c - B_{t-1}^c = M_t^H - M_{t-1}^H$. Further assuming that initial values for its assets and liabilities satisfy $B_{-1}^c = M_{-1}^H$, leads to the central bank balance sheet

$$B_t^c = M_t^H. \quad (21)$$

The central bank has four instruments. It sets the policy rate $R_t^m \geq 1$ and can decide how much money to supply against a randomly selected fraction of treasuries, for which it can adjust $\kappa_t^B \in (0, 1]$ (see 2) in a state contingent way. The central bank can further decide whether it supplies money in exchange for treasuries either outright or temporarily via repos. Specifically, it can control the ratio of treasury repos to outright sales of government bonds $\Omega_t > 0 : M_t^R = \Omega_t M_t^H$, where a sufficiently large value for Ω_t ensures that injections are always positive, $I_{i,t} > 0$. Finally, the central bank can decide to purchase loans. In each period, it decides on a randomly selects a share of secured loans $\kappa_t \in [0, 1]$ that is offered to be exchanged for money under repos, such that that loans are held by the central bank not until maturity.

Equilibrium A definition of a competitive equilibrium, for which we simplify the notation using $L_t = L_{l,t} = -L_{b,t}$, $L_t^r = L_{l,t}^r = -L_{b,t}^r$, and $I_t^L = I_{l,t}^L$, is given in Appendix A.1. Whether money supply is effectively rationed or not depends, in particular, on policy choices. For the analysis of optimal monetary policy, we will therefore distinguish between the two cases where money supply is either effectively rationed or not rationed, which is equivalent to the case where the central bank supplies money in a lump-sum way (as typically assumed in the literature). In this case, the loan rate is identical with the policy rate $R_t^L = R_t^m$ (see 12-13). Before we examine the policy problem of the central bank, we describe the first best allocation, which serves as a benchmark for the

subsequent analysis. The following proposition describes the first best allocation.¹²

Proposition 1 *The first best allocation $\{c_{b,t}^*, c_{l,t}^*, n_{b,t}^*, n_{l,t}^*, h_{b,t}^*, h_{l,t}^*\}_{t=0}^\infty$ satisfies*

$$\epsilon_b(c_{b,t}^*)^{-\sigma} = \epsilon_l(c_{l,t}^*)^{-\sigma}, h_{b,t}^* = h_{l,t}^*, n_{b,t}^* = n_{l,t}^*, \quad (22)$$

$$\epsilon_b(c_{b,t}^*)^{-\sigma} = [\chi/(a_t\alpha)]0.5^\eta(n_t^*)^{1+\eta-\alpha}, h_{b,t}^* + h_{l,t}^* = h \text{ and } c_{l,t}^* + c_{b,t}^* = a_t(n_t^*)^\alpha.$$

Proof. See Appendix A.1. ■

Under the first best allocation, the marginal utilities of consumption are identical for borrowers and lenders, and their end-of-period stock of housing is the same (see 22). This will typically not be the case in a competitive equilibrium where the borrowing constraint is binding. In Section 4.2.2, we examine how the central bank can relax the borrowing constraint by purchases of loans. For this policy to be non-neutral, money has to be supplied at a favorable price which implies that access to money is effectively constrained by the available amount of assets eligible for central bank operations. Specifically, the central bank has to set the policy rate below the lender's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, implying $R_t^m < R_t^l$ (see 17).

3 Constrained borrowing and monetary policy

In this Section, we examine the impact of the existence of the borrowing constraint on the allocation and on prices. We demonstrate how the long-run equilibrium is affected by the borrowing constraint and how the tightness of the borrowing constraint is altered by monetary policy. The parameter values applied for this analysis and in the subsequent Sections are given in Table A1 in Appendix A.7. We set most parameter equal to values that are standard in the literature, i.e. $\beta = 0.99$, $\sigma_{(h)} = 2$, $\eta = 1$, $\phi = 0.7$, $\alpha = 0.66$, and $\chi = 98$, the latter implying a first best working time share of roughly one third. The utility weight on housing of $\gamma = 0.1$ is taken from Iacoviello (2005) and the steady state housing share qh/y equals 0.18. Given that the model is evidently too stylized to be able to match some observed measure of heterogeneity, the realizations of the idiosyncratic shock are simply set at $\epsilon_l = 0.5$ and $\epsilon_b = 1.5$ with equal probabilities, 0.5. Likewise, we apply benchmark values for the parameter referring to the credit market that are particularly useful to reveal the main novel results and set the share of unsecured loans v at 1/2 and the liquidation share z at 0.8 (which is smaller than Iacoviello's (2005) value of 0.9). For the stochastic processes, we assume that the autocorrelation of aggregate shocks equals 0.9 and their standard deviation equals 0.005.

Suppose that monetary policy acts in a non-optimizing way and that money supply is not rationed. Under the parameter values described above, the borrowing constraint will be binding in a long-run

¹²According to the conditions in proposition 1, the solution for $c_{b,t}^*$ and $h_{b,t}^*$ are given by $c_{b,t}^* = a_t^{\frac{1+\eta}{1-\alpha+\eta+\alpha\sigma}} [\alpha\epsilon_{b,t}/(\chi 0.5^\eta)]^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha+\eta+\alpha\sigma}} [1 + (\epsilon_{l,t}/\epsilon_{b,t})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}]^{-\frac{1-\alpha+\eta}{1-\alpha+\eta+\alpha\sigma}}$ and $h_{b,t}^* = 0.5h$.




Figure 1: Steady state values for different inflation rates

equilibrium. In the steady state, the central bank is then endowed with a single choice variable, which is assumed to be the inflation rate (or the inflation target). The loan rate is then determined by the demand and the supply of loans in the private credit market as summarized in (16) and (17). Given that money is assumed not to be rationed, the loan rate equals the lender's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in nominal terms (see 17)

$$R^L = (\pi/\beta) \cdot (\epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma} / \bar{c}^{-\sigma}), \quad (23)$$

where $\bar{c}^{-\sigma} = 0.5\epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma} + 0.5\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma}$ and variables without a time index denote steady state values. If borrowing were unconstrained (i.e. perfect enforcement) or the borrowing constraint were slack $\zeta_{b,t} = 0$, the borrower's and the lender's marginal utility of consumption would be identical $\epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma} = \epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma}$. Thus, consumption of the lender satisfies (see 18 for $\zeta_{l,t} = 0$):

$$c_l = (\epsilon_l/\epsilon_b)^{1/\sigma} c_b \quad \text{if } \zeta_b = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad c_l > (\epsilon_l/\epsilon_b)^{1/\sigma} c_b \quad \text{if } \zeta_b > 0. \quad (24)$$

Thus, constrained borrowing ($\zeta_b > 0$) increases relative consumption of the lender, which tends to reduce the loan rate (see 23). This effect is more pronounced, the tighter the borrowing constraint is, e.g. when the liquidation value of housing z is lower (see Figure 1). When the central bank raises the inflation rate, the loan rate also increases (see 23). The higher inflation rate further tends to reduce overall consumption, due to the inflation tax on consumption as a cash good, $\chi 0.5n^\eta = w\beta\bar{c}^{-\sigma}/\pi$ (see 9, 12, and 11). The impact of a tighter borrowing constraint on consumption of both types is intuitive: A lower liquidation value z leads to a larger reduction in the borrower's consumption, while the lender's consumption can even exceed first best (see 24). The impact of the

borrowing constraint on housing is most pronounced. Borrowers are willing to increase investment in housing in order to raise the value of collateral and, thereby, to relax the borrowing constraint. Thus, the borrowing constraint distorts the allocation of resources (goods and housing), while this distortion is amplified by a higher inflation rate (and thus by a higher loan rate).

Based on this line of arguments, the central bank should choose a low inflation rate to mitigate the distortions due to the inflation tax and the borrowing constraint. Put differently, there is no gain from higher inflation that would reduce the real value of nominal debt if it were issued intertemporally (as, for example, in DeFiore et al., 2011). Given that prices are set in an imperfectly flexible way, the price level should however be stable in the long-run to avoid welfare losses from an inefficient allocation of resources (working time) due to price dispersion (see Section 4.2). Thus, a welfare-maximizing central bank should set the inflation rate close to one, as indicated by the steady state utility of the representative agent (which is always strictly smaller than under first best). If, however, it were able to control the loan rate independently from the inflation rate, it might be able to increase welfare. This is in principle possible under money rationing where the long-run loan rate is not given by (23), but instead by $\frac{1}{R^L} = \frac{\beta}{\pi} \frac{c^{-\sigma}}{\epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}} [1 + \frac{\kappa}{1+v} (\frac{R^L}{R^m} - 1)]$, which shows that the central bank can influence the loan rate not only via the inflation rate. Specifically, it can control the inflation rate via the money supply constraint (2) and can further manipulate the loan rate by adjusting the policy rate R^m and the share of purchased loans κ .

4 Optimal monetary policy

In this Section, we examine the policy plan of a central bank that aims at maximizing welfare, for which we assume that it is able to perfectly commit to future policies. We restrict our attention to time-invariant policies plans, neglecting the issue of time inconsistency that typically prevails in such a framework (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010). We consider the entire set of conditions that describe the competitive equilibrium (see Definition 3 in Appendix A.1) as constraints to the optimization problem of the central bank. Given that fiscal policy is assumed to have access to lump-sum taxation, we can neglect fiscal policy except for the supply of treasuries, which serve as eligible assets for open market operations. In the first part of this Section, we briefly assess the case of flexible prices and perfect competition and show that first best cannot be implemented (regardless whether money supply is rationed or not). In the second part of this Section, we consider sticky prices and examine first optimal monetary policy under the assumption that money is supplied in a non-rationed way. We then show that once the central bank rations money supply it can enhance welfare by purchasing loans at a favorable price.

4.1 A flexible price version

Before we turn to the empirically relevant case of imperfectly set prices, we briefly examine how the monetary policy decision is affected by the existence of the borrowing constraint under flexible prices. For this, we examine a reduced set of equilibrium sequences. Details can be found in Appendix A.4, where we further show how an inflation target can be implemented in a competitive equilibrium under money rationing regime. For the case where prices are perfectly flexible and competition is perfect, an equilibrium can be defined as follows.

Definition 1 *A competitive equilibrium under perfectly flexible prices and perfect competition is given by a set of sequences $\{c_{b,t}, c_{l,t}, n_t, R_t^L, h_{b,t}, q_t, l_t^r, \pi_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ satisfying*

$$0 = n_t^{1+\eta-\alpha} - \omega a_t \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}], \quad (25)$$

$$1/R_t^L = (c_{b,t}^{\sigma} / \epsilon_b) \{ \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] + \gamma((1+v)q_t z_t)^{-1} [(h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma h}] \} \quad (26)$$

$$0 = -[q_t n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} / a_t] + \beta E_t [q_{t+1} n_{t+1}^{\eta+1-\alpha} / a_{t+1}] + \gamma \omega (h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma h}, \quad (27)$$

$$a_t n_t^{\alpha} = c_{l,t} + c_{b,t}, \quad (28)$$

$$c_{b,t} = c_{l,t} + [z_t q_t h_{b,t} 2(1+v) + l_t^r] / R_t^L, \text{ if } \zeta_{b,t} = \gamma(q_t z_t)^{-1} (h_{l,t}^{-\sigma h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma h}) > 0, \quad (29)$$

$$\text{or } c_{b,t} \leq c_{l,t} + [z_t q_t h_{b,t} 2(1+v) + l_t^r] / R_t^L, \text{ if } \zeta_{b,t} = 0,$$

and if $\varsigma_{l,t} = \chi n_{l,t}^{\eta} / w_t (R_t^L - R_t^m) / R_t^m > 0$:

$$1/R_t^L = \beta (c_{l,t}^{\sigma} / \epsilon_l) E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] \{ 1 + [\kappa_t / (1+v)] [(R_t^L / R_t^m) - 1] \}, \quad (30)$$

$$c_{l,t} = 0.5(1 + \Omega_t) m_t^H - (1+v) z_t q_t h_{b,t} / R_t^L, \quad (31)$$

$$\text{where } (1 + \Omega_t) m_t^H = \kappa_t^B b_{t-1} \pi_t^{-1} / R_t^m + m_{t-1}^H \pi_t^{-1}, \text{ and } b_t + m_t^H = \Gamma (b_{t-1} + m_{t-1}^H) / \pi_t,$$

$$l_t^r = \kappa_t z_t q_t h_{b,t} R_t^L / R_t^m, \quad (32)$$

or if $\varsigma_{l,t} = 0$:

$$1/R_t^L = \beta (c_{l,t}^{\sigma} / \epsilon_l) E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}], \quad (33)$$

$$R_t^L = R_t^m, \quad (34)$$

$$l_t^r = 0, \quad (35)$$

where $\omega = \frac{\alpha}{(1-\tau^n)\chi(0.5)^{\eta}}$ and $\tau^n = 0$, and the transversality conditions, for a monetary policy $\{\kappa_t, R_t^m \geq 1\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and exogenous sequences $\{a_t, z_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, given $h > 0$, and $m_{-1}^H > 0$, and $b_{-1} > 0$ if $\varsigma_{l,t} > 0$.

As revealed by the conditions in Definition 1, there are more instruments available for the central bank if it supplies money in a rationed way (30)-(32). Notably, the fraction of bonds eligible for open market operations κ_t^B can be adjusted by the central bank to support a particular competitive equilibrium (see Appendix A.4), such that the cash constraint (31) is not a binding restriction for implementable allocations from the point of view of the central bank. Under money rationing, the central bank can then manipulate the loan rate not only via the inflation but also by setting the

policy rate R_t^m and the share of purchased loans κ_t (see 30). To effectively ration money supply, it has to set the policy rate below the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of the lender, such that the multipliers on the money supply constraints (2) and (4) are strictly positive, $\varsigma_{l,t} > 0$ and $\eta_{l,t} > 0$. Otherwise, the money supply constraint is slack and the loan rate equals the lender's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution. Thus, rationing money supply endows the central bank with additional instruments, which can be used to address welfare-reducing distortions in a more effective way than under a single instrument regime. According to this simple principle, the central bank is able to enhance welfare by simultaneously controlling money supply and the policy rate. However, the central bank is – even under flexible prices and perfect competition – not able to implement the long-run efficient allocation (as described in Proposition 1) regardless of whether money supply is rationed or not. This property is summarized in the following proposition.

Proposition 2 *Consider a competitive equilibrium as given in definition 1. A long-run efficient allocation can, in general, neither be implemented under rationed money supply nor under non-rationed money supply.*

Proof. See Appendix A.1 ■

The implementation of the long-run efficient allocation would in principle require the central bank to set the inflation rate according to the Friedman rule to undo the distortion induced by the costs of money holdings (see 25). Efficiency further requires holdings of housing and marginal utilities of consumption to be identical for all members (see 22), which implies the loan rate to be equal to one (see 26) and the policy rate to be identical to the loan rate (see 30). Hence, a central bank cannot implement the long-run efficient allocation under a money rationing regime (which relies on setting the policy rate at $R_t^m < R_t^L$). Moreover, the credit market is distorted by the borrowing constraint, which, in general, demands a loan rate different from one.

Even though money rationing does not matter for the impossibility to implement first best, it can affect the allocation under second best. To demonstrate this, we compare the steady state under non-optimizing policy regimes with money rationing (see Appendix A.4) to the steady state under optimal monetary policy without money rationing (see last part of Appendix A.5). Table 1 shows the steady state values for under the first best allocation and for different monetary policy regimes for two liquidation values of collateral ($z = 0.8$ and $z = 0.4$). It should be noted that these results are presented for demonstration purposes only, given that the values are computed while ignoring the zero lower bound on interest rates and the restriction $\kappa_t \leq 1$ (values that violate of these constraints are marked with a star). The results for the optimal policy regime reveal that the central bank will not apply the Friedman rule (i.e. $\pi = \beta = 0.99$) when it faces distortions due to the credit market friction. In fact, it sets the inflation rate at an even lower value $\pi < \beta$ to ease the borrowing constraint by reducing the loan rate ($R^L < 1$).

Table 1: Steady state values under flexible prices

	z=0.8			z=0.4	
	First best	Optimal policy	Money rationing	Optimal policy	Money rationing
Consumption of the borrower	0.3018	0.3017	0.3018	0.3012	0.3018
Consumption of the lender	0.1742	0.1743	0.1742	0.1744	0.1742
Borrower's housing share	0.5	0.5323	0.5176	0.63669	0.5879
Working time	0.3248	0.3248	0.3248	0.3248	0.3248
Loan rate	–	0.9988*	0.9982*	0.9929*	0.9912*
Inflation rate	–	0.9897	0.99	0.9885	0.99
Policy rate	–	–	0.99*	–	0.98*
Share of purchased loans	–	–	0.3	–	1.2*
Representative agent's utility	–3.12078	–3.12081	–3.12079	–3.12138	–3.12101

Note: A star "*" indicates that the lower bound on interest rates or constraints on policy instruments are violated.

Under a more severe credit market friction, $z = 0.4$, deviations to the first best allocation and from the Friedman rule are more pronounced under an optimal policy regime without money rationing. A monetary policy regime that rations money supply can then reduce the deviations from the first best allocation and increase steady state utility of a representative agent, for example, by setting the inflation rate at the Friedman rule (see Appendix A.4 on details how the central bank implements the long-run inflation rate), which eliminates the inflation tax, and by purchasing loans at a sufficiently low policy rate to address the credit friction, which is demonstrated for $z = 0.8$ with $R^m = 0.99$ and $\kappa = 0.3$ and for $z = 0.4$ with $R^m = 0.98$ and $\kappa = 1.2$. Thus, the central bank can in principle implement a more favorable outcome by purchasing loans, which will subsequently be shown for a version with a plausible degree of price rigidity and without violating constraints on policy instruments.

4.2 Optimal monetary policy under sticky prices

For the flexible price version of the model, it has already been established that monetary policy cannot implement first best (see Proposition 2) and that the central bank acting without money rationing will not implement the Friedman rule. Here, we examine monetary policy for the empirically more relevant case of sticky prices and compare optimal monetary policy with and without money rationing. Throughout the analysis, all relevant constraints on the policy instruments are – in contrast to the cases presented in Table 1 – taken into account.

4.2.1 Non-rationed money supply

The central bank essentially faces three frictions: the borrowing constraint, the cash-credit good distortion, and sticky prices. Notably, we assume that the distortion due to the average price mark-

Table 2: Steady state values under optimal monetary policy w/o money rationing

	First best	Benchmark parameter values	More flexible prices	Tighter borrowing constraint
Consumption of the borrower	0.3018	0.3009	0.3010	0.3003
Consumption of the lender	0.1742	0.1739	0.1739	0.1744
Borrower's housing share	0.5	0.5334	0.5333	0.6369
Working time	0.3248	0.3235	0.3237	0.3233
Loan rate	–	1.0091	1.0007	1.0044
Inflation rate	–	1	0.9982	1
Representative agent utility	–3.12078	–3.12086	–3.12085	–3.12145

up is eliminated by a subsidy, $\tau^n = 1/\varepsilon$, as typically assumed in the literature (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010). The policy problem for the case where money is supplied in a non-rationed way is described in Appendix A.5. As discussed in Section 2.2, asset purchases are then irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation.

Table 2 presents steady state values for optimal monetary policy without money rationing for the benchmark parameterization (specifically, for $\phi = 0.7$ and $z = 0.8$) and for the case where price are more flexible ($\phi = 0.1$), and for the case where the borrowing constraint is tighter ($z = 0.4$, see last column). For the benchmark case, the steady state inflation rate turns out to equal one – implying long-run price stability – for an empirically plausible degree of price rigidity ($\phi = 0.7$),¹³ while the long-run loan rate is then given by $R^L = 1.0091$. When the degree of price rigidity is smaller ($\phi = 0.1$), the central bank implements a mean inflation rate below one and a mean loan rate that is lower than under more rigid prices (see Table 2). The central bank then induced a lower price of loans and thereby reduces the distortion due to the borrowing constraint. This can be seen from a comparison of the allocation under the optimal policy with the first best allocation, which shows that the gap for the borrower's consumption slightly is reduced. Thus, under more flexible prices an optimal monetary policy is able to reduce the financial distortions in a more successful way.

This pattern can also be observed in the impulse responses to aggregate shocks presented in the Figures 2 and 3, where the responses are shown as deviations from steady state values that differ between both versions (with higher and lower degree of price rigidity). All impulse responses in the paper are given in percentage deviations from the steady state. The responses to a contractionary productivity shock are very similar for both cases (see Figure 2). Substantial differences can only

¹³Thus, the steady state under the optimal monetary policy is identical to the steady state under the non-optimizing policy described in the previous section.




Figure 2: Responses to a contractionary productivity shock under optimal policy w/o money rationing [Note: Steady states are not identical.]

be observed for the responses of the inflation rate and the loan rate. The latter increases to a larger extent under more rigid prices, which tends to amplify the adverse borrowing conditions. Hence, in order to stabilize inflation, optimal policy is then willing to accept a more pronounced loan contraction than under less rigid prices. The responses of consumption and working time are virtually identical for both versions, while it should be noted that they are presented as deviations from different steady states. Figure 3 shows responses to a fall in the liquidation value of housing. Again, the inflation response reveals that under a reasonable degree of price stickiness ($\phi = 0.7$), an optimizing central bank mainly aims at stabilizing prices. Under more flexible prices, the central bank strongly reduces the inflation rate. This is associated with a more pronounced reduction in the loan rate, which tends to mitigate the distortion due to the borrowing constraint.

The last column of Table 2 shows results under an optimal monetary policy for a smaller liquidation value of collateral, $z = 0.4$. Intuitively, the distortion induced by the borrowing constraint is then more pronounced, which leads to larger differences from the first best allocation compared to the case with the benchmark parameter values ($z = 0.8$). The exception is the lender's consumption value which is now slightly larger, given that the borrower's consumption is more restricted. Overall, the central bank is not willing to deviate from fully stabilizing prices in favor of reducing distortions due to financial frictions (see also the corresponding impulse responses in Appendix A.8).

4.2.2 Rationed money supply

When the central bank sets the policy rate R_t^m below the lender's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, it can effectively ration money supply, i.e. it induces the money supply constraints




Figure 3: Responses to a lower liquidation value under optimal policy w/o money rationing [Note: Steady states are not identical.]

(2) and (4) to be binding, $\eta_{l,t} > 0$ and $\varsigma_{l,t} > 0$. The money supply instruments κ_t^B and κ_t are then non-neutral in the sense that the central bank can affect the private sector behavior by changing the amount of money supplied in exchange for eligible assets, i.e. treasuries and secured loans. Specifically, the loan rate can be manipulated not only via the lender's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution but also via central bank purchases of loans (see 17).

Non-optimizing policy with money rationing We first consider the case of a severe credit market friction, i.e. a particularly low average liquidation value for collateral ($z = 0.4$). For this case and for the other parameter values applied in this analysis (see also Table A1 in Appendix A.7), the borrowing constraint will be binding even when the central bank conducts loan purchases. We therefore examine the steady state under two non-optimizing monetary policy regimes acting under money rationing. The steady state values of selected variables for two regimes with money rationing are given in Table 3. These policy regimes are both characterized by an inflation rate equal to one and a policy rate set at 1.004. They only differ with regard to the share of purchased loans κ , which equals 50% and 100%. The results presented in Table 3 show that these two non-optimizing policies outperform the optimal policy without money rationing. Specifically, the deviations of the allocation of consumption goods, housing, and working time from the first best allocation are reduced under the money rationing regimes and are further decreased when more loans are purchased. The superiority of the latter regimes is further confirmed by the steady state utility values of the representative agent.

Optimizing policy under money rationing We finally consider the case where the credit market friction is less severe, $z = 0.8$. For this case, we find that the central bank is actually able

Table 3: Steady state values with and w/o money rationing for $z=0.4$

	Optimal policy w/o m. rationing	Policy regime I with m. rationing	Policy regime II with m. rationing	First best
Consumption of the borrower	0.3003	0.3004	0.3005	0.3018
Consumption of the lender	0.1744	0.1743	0.1742	0.1742
Housing of the borrower	0.6369	0.6150	0.5954	0.5
Working time	0.3233	0.3234	0.3234	0.3248
Loan rate	1.0044	1.0049	1.0052	–
Inflation rate	1	1	1	–
Policy rate	–	1.0040	1.0040	–
Share of purchased loans	–	0.5	1	–
Representative agent utility	-3.12145	-3.12126	-3.12112	-3.12078

to undo the distortions stemming from the borrowing constraint by purchasing loans. Under a money rationing regime, it can be shown in a straightforward way that the policy problem can be greatly simplified by using that several equilibrium objects are not relevant and that the central bank is equipped with additional instruments (see Appendix A.6). In particular, we use that the central bank can set the fraction of eligible bonds κ_t^B to adjust the amount of money available for household members in a way that is consistent with the optimally chosen allocation (see Appendix A.4), and that the policy rate R_t^m and the share of purchased loans κ_t can be set to implement a favorable loan rate and to ease the borrowing constraint. Given that there are infinitely many pair of sequences for the policy instruments that can implement the optimal plan, the policy rate R_t^m , which is well below the lender's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, and the share of liquidated loans κ_t are identified by assuming that the borrowing constraint is just not binding.

When the borrowing constraint distorts the credit market allocation just to a small extent, $z = 0.8$, the additional central bank instruments can be used by the central bank to undo the distortions stemming from the borrowing constraint by setting them according to (30) and (29), without violating the constraints that apply for the instruments $\kappa_t \in [0, 1]$ and $R_t^m \geq 1$ in the neighborhood of the long-run equilibrium. For this case, we find that optimal policy under money rationing can enhance welfare compared to the case where monetary policy without money rationing is conducted in an optimal way (see Section 4.2.1). We compute welfare of the representative agent using

$$V = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t 0.5 (u_{b,t} + u_{l,t}),$$

for different policy regimes and assume that the initial values are identical with the corresponding steady state values. Deviations from welfare under the first best allocation (*) are then measured

Table 4: Steady state values with and w/o money rationing for $z=0.8$

	Optimal policy w/o money rationing	Optimal policy with money rationing	First best
Consumption of the borrower	0.3009	0.3012	0.3018
Consumption of the lender	0.1739	0.1737	0.1742
Housing of the borrower	0.5334	0.5	0.5
Working time	0.3235	0.3236	0.3248
Loan rate	1.0091	1.0086	–
Inflation rate	1	1	–
Policy rate	–	1.0026	–
Fraction of purchased loans	–	0.6860	–
Representative agent utility	–3.12086	–3.12083	–3.12078

as permanent consumption values that compensate for the welfare loss under alternative policy regimes, $(c_{perm} - c_{perm}^*)/c_{perm}^*$, where $c_{perm} = ((1 - \beta)(1 - \sigma)V + 1)^{1/(1-\sigma)}$. The computed welfare gain of money rationing is considerably small, while the loss compared to welfare under the first best allocation is almost twice as large, 0.0021, as under the rationing regime, 0.0012 (which are computed applying a second order approximation).

The steady state values given in Table 4 reveal that the difference between the two types of optimal policy regimes are small when the credit market friction is less severe. Nonetheless, they show that an optimal policy under money rationing is able to reduce the differences between the first best allocation and the allocation in a competitive equilibrium. The only exception refers to the lender's consumption, which is lower under both optimal policy regimes than under first best. In the case of non-rationed money supply its value is slightly larger than under money rationing, given that the borrower's consumption is effectively constrained by its collateral value. The allocation under non-rationed money supply exhibits the largest difference to first best for the borrower's housing. This, however, does not have a strong impact on welfare, due to the very small utility weight assigned to housing ($\gamma = 0.1$ compared to $\chi = 98$).

The Figures 4 and 5 further show impulse responses to a contractionary productivity shock and to a reduction in the liquidation value of loans. The responses to the former correspond to the results for the steady state values (see Table 4), i.e. that the allocation hardly differs between both types of optimal policy regimes (except for the distribution of housing). Under money rationing, the central bank is able to undo the distortion due to the borrowing constraint by purchasing loans, such that the consumption gap is reduced and housing is equally held by borrowers and lenders. A reduction in the liquidation value of loans is associated with substantial differences between both types of policies (see Figure 5). As long as the reduction is not too pronounced, the central bank




Figure 4: Responses to a contractionary productivity shock under optimizing policies [Note: Steady states are not identical.]

can thus off-set this shock under a money rationing regime by purchasing loans at a below-market rate. The allocation is then unaffected by the decline in the liquidation value and prices are fully stabilized. For this, the increase in the share of purchased loans, which exerts an expansionary and thus inflationary effect, has to be accompanied with an increases the policy rate to avoid an upward shift in prices.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we examined optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model where money is essential and borrowing between private agents is constrained by available collateral. While the credit market friction could be eased by a low nominal interest rate, a welfare-maximizing central bank predominantly aims at minimizing distortions due to imperfectly set prices, such that the paradigm of price stability prevails. As a consequence, optimal policy largely ignores the credit friction, when monetary policy is conducted in a conventional way, in the sense that only one instruments is available. If, however, the central bank supplies money at a low price against a bounded set of eligible assets, access to money is effectively rationed, which allows the central bank to simultaneously control the price and the amount of money. In this case, the central bank can – in addition to the price rigidity – address the credit market friction by purchasing secured




Figure 5: Responses to a lower liquidation value under optimizing policies [Note: Steady states are not identical.]

loans. Such a policy tends to reduce the lending rate and can welfare be enhancing compared to a conventionally conducted optimal policy monetary regime (without money rationing).

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A Appendix

A.1 Competitive equilibrium

Definition 3 A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences $\{c_{b,t}, c_{l,t}, n_{b,t}, n_{l,t}, n_t, l_t, l_t^r, i_{b,t}, i_{l,t}, i_t^L, m_{b,t}^H, m_{l,t}^H, m_t^H, b_{b,t}, b_{l,t}, b_t, b_t^T, w_t, mc_t, \tilde{Z}_t, s_t, \pi_t, R_t^L, \zeta_{b,t}, h_{l,t}, h_{b,t}, q_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ satisfying

$$n_{l,t} = n_{b,t}, \quad (36)$$

$$\chi n_{b,t}^\eta = w_t \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}], \quad (37)$$

$$1/R_t^L = (c_{b,t}^\sigma / \epsilon_b) \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] + \zeta_{b,t} (c_{b,t}^\sigma / \epsilon_b) / (1 + v), \quad (38)$$

$$1/R_t^L = \beta (c_{l,t}^\sigma / \epsilon_l) E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] \{1 + \frac{\kappa_t}{1+v} [\frac{R_t^L}{R_t^m} - 1]\}, \text{ if } \varsigma_{l,t} > 0, \quad (39)$$

$$\text{or } 1/R_t^L = \beta (c_{l,t}^\sigma / \epsilon_l) E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}], \text{ if } \varsigma_{l,t} = 0,$$

$$c_{l,t} = i_{l,t} + m_{l,t-1}^H \pi_t^{-1} - (1 + v) (l_t / R_t^L) \text{ if } \psi_{l,t} > 0, \quad (40)$$

$$\text{or } c_{l,t} < i_{l,t} + m_{l,t-1}^H \pi_t^{-1} - (1 + v) (l_t / R_t^L) \text{ if } \psi_{l,t} = 0,$$

$$c_{b,t} = i_{b,t} + m_{b,t-1}^H \pi_t^{-1} + [(1 + v)l_t + l_t^r] / R_t^L \text{ if } \psi_{b,t} > 0, \quad (41)$$

$$\text{or } c_{b,t} < i_{b,t} + m_{b,t-1}^H \pi_t^{-1} + [(1 + v)l_t + l_t^r] / R_t^L \text{ if } \psi_{b,t} = 0,$$

$$R_t^m i_{l,t} = \kappa_t^B b_{l,t-1} \pi_t^{-1} \text{ if } \eta_{i,t} = (\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma}) / R_t^m - \beta E_t (\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1} > 0, \quad (42)$$

$$\text{or } R_t^m i_{l,t} < \kappa_t^B b_{l,t-1} \pi_t^{-1} \text{ if } \eta_{i,t} = 0,$$

$$R_t^m i_{b,t} = \kappa_t^B b_{b,t-1} \pi_t^{-1} \text{ if } \eta_{i,t} = (\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma}) / R_t^m - \beta E_t (\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1} > 0, \quad (43)$$

$$\text{or } R_t^m i_{b,t} < \kappa_t^B b_{b,t-1} \pi_t^{-1} \text{ if } \eta_{i,t} = 0,$$

$$l_t = z_t q_t h_{b,t}, \text{ if } \zeta_{b,t} = \{(\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} / R_t^L) - \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}]\} (1 + v) > 0, \quad (44)$$

$$\text{or } l_t \leq z_t q_t h_{b,t}, \text{ if } \zeta_{b,t} = 0,$$

$$R_t^m i_t^L = \kappa_t l_t \text{ if } \varsigma_{l,t} = (\chi n_{l,t}^\eta / w_t) (R_t^L - R_t^m) / R_t^m > 0 \text{ or } i_t^L = 0 \text{ if } \varsigma_{l,t} = 0, \quad (45)$$

$$l_t^r / R_t^L = i_t^L \text{ if } \zeta_{b,t} > 0 \text{ or } l_t^r / R_t^L \leq i_t^L \text{ if } \zeta_{b,t} = 0, \quad (46)$$

$$\zeta_{b,t} q_t z_t = \gamma (h_{l,t}^{-\sigma_h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h}), \quad (47)$$

$$q_t \chi n_{l,t}^\eta / w_t = \gamma h_{l,t}^{-\sigma_h} + \beta E_t [q_{t+1} \chi n_{l,t+1}^\eta / w_{t+1}], \quad (48)$$

$$h = h_{l,t} + h_{b,t}, \quad (49)$$

$$n_t = n_{l,t} + n_{b,t}, \quad (50)$$

$$m_{b,t}^H = m_{l,t}^H, \quad (51)$$

$$b_t = b_{b,t} + b_{l,t}, \quad (52)$$

$$m_t^H = m_{b,t}^H + m_{l,t}^H, \quad (53)$$

$$i_{b,t} = (1 + \Omega_t) m_{b,t}^H - m_{b,t-1}^H \pi_t^{-1}, \quad (54)$$

$$i_{l,t} = (1 + \Omega_t) m_{l,t}^H - m_{l,t-1}^H \pi_t^{-1}, \quad (55)$$

$$0 = (1 - \tau^n) w_t - mc_t a_t \alpha n_t^{\alpha-1}, \quad (56)$$

$$Z_{1,t} / Z_{2,t} = \tilde{Z}_t (\varepsilon - 1) / \varepsilon, \text{ where } Z_{1,t} = (\chi n_{b,t}^\eta / w_t) (a_t n_t^\alpha / s_t) mc_t + \phi \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^\varepsilon Z_{1,t+1} \quad (57)$$

$$\text{and } Z_{2,t} = (\chi n_{b,t}^\eta / w_t) (a_t n_t^\alpha / s_t) + \phi \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^{\varepsilon-1} Z_{2,t+1}, \quad (58)$$

where $\psi_{l,t} = (R_t^L - 1) (\mu_t \chi n_{l,t}^\eta / w_t) + R_t^L \kappa_t \varsigma_{l,t} / (1 + v) \geq 0$ and $\psi_{b,t} = (R_t^L - 1) (\mu_t \chi n_{b,t}^\eta / w_t) + \zeta_{b,t} R_t^L / (1 + v) \geq 0$, and

$$1 = (1 - \phi)(\tilde{Z}_t)^{1-\varepsilon} + \phi\pi_t^{\varepsilon-1}, \quad (59)$$

$$s_t = (1 - \phi)\tilde{Z}_t^{-\varepsilon} + \phi s_{t-1}\pi_t^\varepsilon, \quad (60)$$

$$a_t n_t^\alpha / s_t = c_{l,t} + c_{b,t}, \quad (61)$$

$$b_t^T = \Gamma b_{t-1}^T / \pi_t, \quad (62)$$

$$b_t^T = b_t + m_t^H, \quad (63)$$

the transversality conditions, a monetary policy setting $\{R_t^m \geq 1, \kappa_t^B \in (0, 1], \kappa_t \in [0, 1], \Omega_t \geq 0\}_{t=0}^\infty$, a subsidy τ^n , given Γ , $\{a_t, z_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$, $m_{b,-1}^H = m_{l,-1}^H > 0$, $b_{b,-1} = b_{l,-1} > 0$, $b_{-1} = b_{b,-1} + b_{l,-1} > 0$, $m_{-1}^H = m_{b,-1}^H + m_{l,-1}^H > 0$, and $s_{-1} = 1$.

A.2 First best

Proof of proposition 1. Using $n_t = n_{l,t} + n_{b,t}$ and $n_{l,t} = n_{b,t}$, the social planner problem can be summarized as

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_{l,t}, c_{b,t}, h_{l,t}, h_{b,t}, n_t, n_{j,t}, y_{k,t}\}_{t=0}^\infty} & E \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \left\{ 0.5 \left[\epsilon_b (c_{b,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1) + \epsilon_l (c_{l,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1) \right] (1 - \sigma)^{-1} \right. \\ & \left. - \chi (0.5n_t)^{1+\eta} (1 + \eta)^{-1} + 0.5\gamma [(h_{b,t-1}^{1-\sigma_h} - 1) + (h_{l,t-1}^{1-\sigma_h} - 1)] (1 - \sigma_h)^{-1} \right\} \\ \text{s.t. } & a_t \int_0^1 n_{j,t}^\alpha dj = \int_0^1 y_{k,t} dk, \quad \int_0^1 n_{j,t} dj = n_t, \\ & h = \int_0^1 h_{b,t} di + \int_0^1 h_{l,t} di, \quad \int_0^1 y_{k,t}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} dk = \left(\int_0^1 c_{b,t} di + \int_0^1 c_{l,t} di \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}}. \end{aligned}$$

The first order conditions can easily be simplified to $\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} = \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma}$, $\chi (0.5n_t)^\eta = a_t \alpha n_t^{\alpha-1} \epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma}$, $h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h} = h_{l,t}^{-\sigma_h}$, $h_{b,t} + h_{l,t} = h$, and $c_{l,t} + c_{b,t} = a_t n_t^\alpha$. These conditions immediately lead to $c_{b,t} = a_t^{\frac{1+\eta}{1-\alpha+\eta+\alpha\sigma}} [\alpha \epsilon_b / (\chi 0.5^\eta)]^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha+\eta+\alpha\sigma}} [1 + (\epsilon_l / \epsilon_b)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}]^{-\frac{1-\alpha+\eta}{1-\alpha+\eta+\alpha\sigma}}$, $c_{l,t} = (\epsilon_l / \epsilon_b)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_{b,t}$, $h_{b,t} = h_{l,t}$, $n_t = (c_t / a_t)^{1/\alpha}$, which characterize the first best allocation. ■

A.3 Flexible prices

Proof of proposition 2. Consider the long-run competitive equilibrium as given in Definition 1. The long-run equilibrium values $\{c_b, c_l, n, R^L, h_b, q\}$ then satisfy

$$1/R^L = (c_b^\sigma / \epsilon_b) \beta 0.5 (\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}) \pi^{-1} + (c_b^\sigma / \epsilon_b) \gamma ((1 + v)qz)^{-1} [(h - h_b)^{-\sigma_h} - h_b^{-\sigma_h}] \quad (64)$$

$$1/R^L = [(c_l^\sigma / \epsilon_l) \beta 0.5 (\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}) \pi^{-1} \{1 + [\kappa / (1 + v)] [(R^L / R^m) - 1]\}], \text{ if } \varsigma_l > 0, \quad (65)$$

$$\text{or } 1/R^L = \beta (c_l^\sigma / \epsilon_l) \beta 0.5 (\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}) \pi^{-1} \text{ and } R^m = R^L \text{ if } \varsigma_l = 0,$$

$$n^{1+\eta-\alpha} / \omega = \beta 0.5 (\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}) \pi^{-1}, \quad (66)$$

$$c_b = c_l + [zqh_b 2(1 + v) + l^r] / R^L, \text{ if } \zeta_b > 0, \text{ where } l^r = 0, \text{ if } \varsigma_l = 0, \quad (67)$$

$$\text{or } c_b \leq c_l + [zqh_b 2(1 + v) + l^r] / R^L,$$

$q = \gamma\omega(h - h_b)^{-\sigma_h} / (n^{\eta+1-\alpha} (1 - \beta))$ and $n^\alpha = c_l + c_b$. Given that the long-run first best allocation satisfies $\epsilon_b (c_b^*)^{-\sigma} = \epsilon_l (c_l^*)^{-\sigma}$, and $\epsilon_i (c_i^*)^{-\sigma} = (n^*)^{1+\eta-\alpha} / \omega$, (66) implies that the implementation of a long-run efficient allocation would require $\pi = \beta$. Using $h_b^* = h_l^*$ and $\epsilon_b (c_b^*)^{-\sigma} = \epsilon_l (c_l^*)^{-\sigma}$ as well as (64) and (65), shows that long-run efficiency further requires $R^L = R^m = 1$ and thus $\varsigma_l = 0$. Eliminating q in the borrowing constraint (67), and again using $\epsilon_b (c_b^*)^{-\sigma} = \epsilon_l (c_l^*)^{-\sigma}$ and $h_b^* = h_l^*$, then gives $c_b^* = 2z(1 + v)\gamma\omega(0.5h)^{1-\sigma_h} / \{[1 - (\epsilon_l/\epsilon_b)^{1/\sigma}]n^{\eta+1-\alpha} (1 - \beta) R^L\}$. Further, substituting out n with $n = (2c_b^*)^{1/\alpha}$ and c_b^* with $c_b^* = (\epsilon_b\omega)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha+\eta+\alpha\sigma}} [1 + (\epsilon_l/\epsilon_b)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}]^{-\frac{1-\alpha+\eta}{1-\alpha+\eta+\alpha\sigma}}$, implies that the implementation of a long-run efficient allocation requires the loan rate R^L to satisfy $R^L = \Lambda$, where

$$\Lambda = \frac{2z(1 + v)}{1 - (\epsilon_l/\epsilon_b)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} \frac{\gamma\omega(0.5h)^{1-\sigma_h}}{0.5(1 - \beta)} \left(2[\epsilon_b\omega]^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha+\eta+\alpha\sigma}} [1 + (\epsilon_l/\epsilon_b)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}]^{-\frac{1-\alpha+\eta}{1-\alpha+\eta+\alpha\sigma}} \right)^{-(\eta+1)/\alpha}. \quad (68)$$

Given that Λ only consists of exogenously given terms (see 68), the two conditions $R^L = \Lambda$ and $R^L = 1$ are in general inconsistent, implying that the long-run efficient allocation cannot be implemented. ■

A.4 Non-optimizing policy with money rationing

In this section, we describe how a competitive equilibrium can be implemented by a central bank that effectively rations money supply. Consider a competitive equilibrium as given in Definition 3. Under under money rationing a competitive equilibrium can then be reduced to a set of sequences $\{c_{b,t}, c_{l,t}, n_t, mc_t, \tilde{Z}_t, s_t, \pi_t, R_t^L, h_{b,t}, q_t, b_t, b_t^T, m_t^H\}_{t=0}^\infty$ satisfying (59)-(62),

$$n_t^{1+\eta-\alpha} / (\omega mc_t a_t) = \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}], \quad (69)$$

$$\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} / R_t^L = \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] + \gamma((h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h}) / [q_t z_t (1 + v)] \quad (70)$$

$$\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} / R_t^L = \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] \{1 + [\kappa_t / (1 + v)] [(R_t^L / R_t^m) - 1]\}, \quad (71)$$

$$c_{b,t} - c_{l,t} = z_t q_t h_{b,t} ((1 + v) (2/R_t^L) + \kappa_t / R_t^m), \quad (72)$$

$$q_t n_t^{1+\eta-\alpha} / (mc_t a_t) = \gamma\omega (h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} + \beta E_t [q_{t+1} n_{t+1}^{1+\eta-\alpha} / (mc_{t+1} a_{t+1})], \quad (73)$$

$$Z_{1,t} / Z_{2,t} = \tilde{Z}_t (\varepsilon - 1) / \varepsilon, \text{ where } Z_{1,t} = n_t^{1+\eta} (\omega s_t)^{-1} + \phi \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^\varepsilon Z_{1,t+1}, \quad (74)$$

$$\text{and } Z_{2,t} = n_t^{1+\eta} (\omega mc_t s_t)^{-1} + \phi \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^{\varepsilon-1} Z_{2,t+1},$$

$$0.5(1 + \Omega_t) m_t^H = c_{l,t} + (1 + v) z_t q_t h_{b,t} / R_t^L, \quad (75)$$

$$\kappa_t^B b_{t-1} \pi_t^{-1} / R_t^m = (1 + \Omega_t) m_t^H - m_{t-1}^H \pi_t^{-1}, \quad (76)$$

(where $\omega = 1 / [(1 - \tau^n) (\chi/\alpha) (0.5)^\eta]$) the transversality conditions, a monetary policy setting $\{R_t^m \in [1, \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} / \beta E_t 0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}], \kappa_t \in [0, 1], \kappa_t^B \in (0, 1], \Omega_t \geq 0\}_{t=0}^\infty$, a subsidy τ^n , given $\{a_t, z_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$, $\Gamma > 0$, $s_{-1} = 1$, $b_{-1}^T > 0$, $b_{-1} > 0$, and $m_{-1}^H > 0$.

For the characterization of the steady state, where all variables are either constant or grow/shrink at a constant rate, we assume that the central bank sets an inflation target π^* that has to be iden-

tical with the long-run inflation rate π in a rational expectations equilibrium. For this, we consider two scenarios for the supply of government bonds (62). First, suppose that public debt is issued in a way that is consistent with the inflation target, $\Gamma = \pi^*$, such that (62) is consistent with $\pi^* = \pi$ for constant real debt. Given π , the steady state values for \tilde{Z}_t , $m c_t$, and s_t are given by $\tilde{Z} = [\frac{1-\phi\pi^{\varepsilon-1}}{1-\phi}]^{1/(1-\varepsilon)}$, $m c = \tilde{Z} \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \frac{1-\phi\beta\pi^\varepsilon}{1-\phi\beta\pi^{\varepsilon-1}}$, and $s = \frac{(1-\phi)\tilde{Z}^{-\varepsilon}}{1-\phi\pi^\varepsilon}$. Then, the steady state values n , c_l , c_b , R^L , h_b , and q , can – for a constant long-run policy rate $R^m \geq 1$ – be determined by solving

$$\begin{aligned} n^{1+\eta-\alpha}\pi/\beta &= 0.5(\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma})\omega m c, \quad n^\alpha/s = c_l + c_b, \\ 1/R^L &= \beta (c_l^\sigma/\epsilon_l) 0.5(\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma})\pi^{-1} (1 + (\kappa/(1+v)) ((R^L/R^m) - 1)), \\ \epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} &= R^L \beta 0.5(\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma})\pi^{-1} + R^L (\gamma/qz(1+v)) ((h - h_b)^{-\sigma_h} - h_b^{-\sigma_h}), \\ c_b - c_l &= zq h_b ((1+v) (2/R^L) + \kappa/R^m), \quad \gamma\omega(h - h_b)^{-\sigma_h} = qn^{\eta+1-\alpha} m c^{-1} (1 - \beta), \end{aligned}$$

Once c_l , R^L , h_b , and q are known, the steady state values m^H and b are given by $m^H = \frac{c_l + (1+v)zq h_b/R^L}{0.5(1+\Omega)}$ and $b = \frac{R^m \pi}{\kappa^B} (1 + \Omega - \pi^{-1}) m^H$ given κ^B and Ω .

Now, suppose that government bonds are supplied at a rate that is not identical to the inflation target, $\Gamma \neq \pi^*$. Then, the total stock of bonds b_t^T might grow or shrink in a long-run equilibrium at a constant rate Γ/π (see 62). The money demand condition (75) then requires for constant steady state values c_l , R^L , h_b , q , and z , that the term $\tilde{m}_t = (1 + \Omega_t)m_t^H$ is also constant in the long-run. Using the latter and (63) to eliminate b_t^T and m_t^H in (62) and (63), leads to $\kappa_t^B b_t = R_t^m \pi_t [\tilde{m}_t - \tilde{m}_{t-1}(1 + \Omega_{t-1})^{-1} \pi_t^{-1}]$ and $[b_t + \tilde{m}_t/(1 + \Omega_t)] = \Gamma [b_{t-1} + \tilde{m}_{t-1}/(1 + \Omega_{t-1})]/\pi_t$. Further, substituting out b_t , gives

$$\left[\frac{R_t^m \pi_t}{\kappa_t^B} \left(\tilde{m}_t - \frac{\tilde{m}_{t-1} \pi_t^{-1}}{1 + \Omega_{t-1}} \right) + \frac{\tilde{m}_t}{1 + \Omega_t} \right] = \frac{\Gamma}{\pi_t} \left[\frac{R_{t-1}^m \pi_{t-1}}{\kappa_{t-1}^B} \left(\tilde{m}_{t-1} - \frac{\tilde{m}_{t-2} \pi_{t-1}^{-1}}{1 + \Omega_{t-2}} \right) + \frac{\tilde{m}_{t-1}}{1 + \Omega_{t-1}} \right]. \quad (77)$$

Taking the limit $t \rightarrow \infty$ of both sides of (77), we can use that for a constant long-run inflation rate π and a constant policy rate R^m a steady state is characterized by a constant value for \tilde{m}_t . The term in the square brackets in (77) grows/shrinks with the constant rate Γ/π . When the growth rate of bonds exceeds the inflation rate, $\Gamma > \pi$, this can be guaranteed by a permanently shrinking value for κ_t^B . Thus, the central bank can let κ_t^B grow at the rate π/Γ and can let the share of money supplied outright go to zero in the long-run, i.e. it can set κ_t^B and $1/\Omega_t$ according to $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \kappa_t^B/\kappa_{t-1}^B = \pi/\Gamma < 1$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} 1/\Omega_t = 0$ if $\Gamma > \pi$. For $\Gamma < \pi$, the term in the square bracket in (77) permanently shrinks, which can not be supported by a growing value κ_t^B without violating the restriction $\kappa_t^B \leq 1$. In this case, the central bank can let κ_t^B go to zero and can let the share $1/\Omega_t$ of money supplied outright grow in a long-run equilibrium. For $\pi = 1$ and $\Gamma < 1$, it can thus set κ_t^B and $1 + 1/\Omega_t$ in a steady state according to $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} (1 + 1/\Omega_t)/(1 + 1/\Omega_{t-1}) = 1/\Gamma > 1$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \kappa_t^B = 0$.

A.5 Optimal monetary policy under non-rationed money supply

In this Appendix, we consider the policy problem of the central bank that neglects the possibility of effectively rationing money supply. Hence, the money supply constraints (2) and (4) are disregarded for the derivation of the optimal policy plan, which can – by accounting for the remaining constraints imposed by a competitive equilibrium (see Definition 3) – be summarized as

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{\{c_{b,t}, c_{l,t}, n_t, mc_t, \tilde{Z}_t, Z_{1,t}, Z_{2,t}, s_t, \pi_t, h_{b,t}, q_t, R_t^L\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \min_{\{\lambda_{0,t}, \dots, \lambda_{10,t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \quad (78) \\
& E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[0.5\epsilon_b(c_{b,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1)(1-\sigma)^{-1} + 0.5\epsilon_l(c_{l,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1)(1-\sigma)^{-1} - \chi(0.5n_t)^{1+\eta}(1+\eta)^{-1} \right. \\
& \quad \left. + 0.5\gamma(h_{b,t}^{1-\sigma_h} - 1)(1-\sigma_h)^{-1} + 0.5\gamma((h - h_{b,t})^{1-\sigma_h} - 1)(1-\sigma_h)^{-1} \right], \\
& + \lambda_{0,t} \left[0.5\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} - 0.5\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + 0.5R_t^L (\gamma/(1+v)q_t z_t) \left((h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h} \right) \right] \\
& + \lambda_{1,t} \left[(1-\tau^n) \chi 0.5^\eta n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} / (mc_t a_t \alpha) - \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] \right] \\
& + \lambda_{2,t} [a_t n_t^\alpha / s_t - c_{l,t} - c_{b,t}] + \lambda_{3,t} \left[s_t - \phi s_{t-1} \pi_t^\varepsilon - (1-\phi)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} (1-\phi \pi_t^{\varepsilon-1})^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}} \right] \\
& + \lambda_{4,t} \left[(1-\phi)(\tilde{Z}_t)^{1-\varepsilon} + \phi \pi_t^{\varepsilon-1} - 1 \right] + \lambda_{5,t} \left[\tilde{Z}_t (\varepsilon - 1) / \varepsilon - Z_{1,t} / Z_{2,t} \right] \\
& + \lambda_{6,t} \left[Z_{1,t} - (1-\tau^n) (\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} s_t^{-1} - \phi \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^\varepsilon Z_{1,t+1} \right] \\
& + \lambda_{7,t} \left[Z_{2,t} - (1-\tau^n) (\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} (mc_t s_t)^{-1} - \phi \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^{\varepsilon-1} Z_{2,t+1} \right] \\
& + \lambda_{8,t} \left[2 \left((1+v) z_t q_t h_{b,t} / R_t^L \right) - c_{b,t} + c_{l,t} \right] + \lambda_{9,t} \left[\beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] - \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} / R_t^L \right] \\
& + \lambda_{10,t} \left[\frac{q_t n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha}}{mc_t a_t} - \beta E_t \frac{q_{t+1} n_{t+1}^{\eta+1-\alpha}}{mc_{t+1} a_{t+1}} - \gamma \omega (h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} \right]
\end{aligned}$$

Neglecting the conditions for $t = 0$, the solution to the policy problem (78) has to satisfy the following first order conditions

$$\begin{aligned}
h_{b,t} : 0 &= 0.5\gamma h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h} - 0.5\gamma (h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} + \lambda_{0,t} 0.5R_t^L (\gamma/(1+v)q_t z_t) \left(\sigma_h (h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h-1} + \sigma_h h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h-1} \right) \\
& + \lambda_{8,t} 2 \left((1+v) z_t q_t / R_t^L \right) - \lambda_{10,t} \gamma \omega \sigma_h (h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h-1}, \\
R_t^L : 0 &= \lambda_{0,t} 0.5 (\gamma/(1+v)q_t z_t) \left((h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h} \right) - \lambda_{8,t} 2 (1+v) z_t q_t h_{b,t} (R_t^L)^{-2} \\
& + \lambda_{9,t} \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} (R_t^L)^{-2}, \\
q_t : 0 &= -\lambda_{0,t} 0.5R_t^L \gamma / \left((1+v) q_t^2 z_t \right) \left((h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h} \right) + \lambda_{8,t} 2 (1+v) z_t h_{b,t} / R_t^L \\
& + \lambda_{10,t} n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} / (mc_t a_t) - \lambda_{10,t-1} n_{t-1}^{\eta+1-\alpha} / (mc_t a_t), \\
mc_t : 0 &= -[\lambda_{1,t} (1-\tau^n) \chi 0.5^\eta n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} / (mc_t^2 \alpha a_t)] + \lambda_{7,t} (1-\tau^n) (\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} mc_t^{-2} s_t^{-1} \\
& - \lambda_{10,t} q_t n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} / (mc_t^2 a_t) + \lambda_{10,t-1} q_{t-1} n_{t-1}^{\eta+1-\alpha} / (mc_t^2 a_t), \\
s_t : 0 &= -(\lambda_{2,t} a_t n_t^\alpha / s_t^2) + \lambda_{3,t} - \beta E_t \lambda_{3,t+1} \phi \pi_{t+1}^\varepsilon + \lambda_{6,t} (1-\tau^n) (\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} s_t^{-2} \\
& + \lambda_{7,t} (1-\tau^n) (\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} mc_t^{-1} s_t^{-2},
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi_t : 0 &= [\lambda_{1,t-1}(0.5\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + 0.5\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma})/\pi_t^2] + \lambda_{4,t}(\varepsilon - 1)\phi\pi_t^{\varepsilon-2} - \lambda_{6,t-1}\phi\varepsilon\pi_t^{\varepsilon-1}Z_{1,t} \\
&\quad - \lambda_{7,t-1}\phi(\varepsilon - 1)\pi_t^{\varepsilon-2}Z_{2,t} + \lambda_{3,t}[-\phi s_{t-1}\varepsilon\pi_t^{\varepsilon-1} + (1-\phi)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}\varepsilon(1-\phi\pi_t^{\varepsilon-1})^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}-1}\phi\pi_t^{\varepsilon-2}] \\
&\quad - \lambda_{9,t-1}(0.5\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + 0.5\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma})/\pi_t^2, \\
n_t : 0 &= -\chi 0.5^{1+\eta}n_t^\eta + [\lambda_{1,t}(\eta + 1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau^n)\chi 0.5^\eta n_t^{\eta-\alpha}/(mc_t \alpha a_t)] + (\lambda_{2,t}a_t \alpha n_t^{\alpha-1}/s_t) \\
&\quad - \lambda_{6,t}(1 + \eta)(1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha)0.5^\eta n_t^\eta s_t^{-1} - \lambda_{7,t}(1 + \eta)(1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha)0.5^\eta n_t^\eta (mc_t s_t)^{-1} \\
&\quad + \lambda_{10,t}[(\eta + 1 - \alpha)q_t n_t^{\eta-\alpha}/(mc_t a_t)] - \lambda_{10,t-1}[(\eta + 1 - \alpha)q_t n_t^{\eta-\alpha}/(mc_t a_t)], \\
c_{b,t} : 0 &= 0.5\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + 0.5\lambda_{0,t}\epsilon_b \sigma c_{b,t}^{-\sigma-1} + \lambda_{1,t-1}\epsilon_b 0.5\sigma(c_{b,t}^{-\sigma-1}/\pi_t) - \lambda_{2,t} - \lambda_{8,t} \\
&\quad - \lambda_{9,t-1}\epsilon_b 0.5\sigma(c_{b,t}^{-\sigma-1}/\pi_t), \\
c_{l,t} : 0 &= 0.5\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} - 0.5\lambda_{0,t}\sigma\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma-1} + \lambda_{1,t-1}\epsilon_l 0.5\sigma(c_{l,t}^{-\sigma-1}/\pi_t) - \lambda_{2,t} + \lambda_{8,t} \\
&\quad - \lambda_{9,t-1}\epsilon_l 0.5\sigma(c_{l,t}^{-\sigma-1}/\pi_t) + \lambda_{9,t}\sigma\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma-1}/R_t^L, \\
Z_{1,t} : 0 &= -(\lambda_{5,t}/Z_{2,t}) + \lambda_{6,t} - \lambda_{6,t-1}\phi\pi_t^\varepsilon, \\
Z_{2,t} : 0 &= (\lambda_{5,t}Z_{1,t}/Z_{2,t}^2) + \lambda_{7,t} - \lambda_{7,t-1}\phi\pi_t^{\varepsilon-1}, \\
\tilde{Z}_t : 0 &= \lambda_{4,t}(1 - \phi)(1 - \varepsilon)(\tilde{Z}_t)^{-\varepsilon} + \lambda_{5,t}(\varepsilon - 1)/\varepsilon,
\end{aligned}$$

as well as the constraints to the policy problem (78) and the transversality conditions, given τ^n , $\{a_t, z_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$, $h > 0$, $s_{-1} = 1$, as well as $\lambda_{1,-1} = \lambda_1$, $\lambda_{6,-1} = \lambda_6$, $\lambda_{7,-1} = \lambda_7$, $\lambda_{9,-1} = \lambda_9$ and $\lambda_{10,-1} = \lambda_{10}$. The steady state of the solution, where all variables are constant or grow with a constant rate, is a set $\{c_b, c_l, n, mc, s, \pi, h_b, q, R^L, \lambda_0, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3, \lambda_8, \lambda_{10}\}$ satisfying

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= 0.5\gamma [h_b^{-\sigma h} - (h - h_b)^{-\sigma h}] + \lambda_0 0.5R^L (\gamma/(qz)) (\sigma_h(h - h_b)^{-\sigma h-1} + \sigma_h h_b^{-\sigma h-1}) \\
&\quad + \lambda_8 2(zq/R^L) - \lambda_{10}\gamma\omega\sigma_h(h - h_b)^{-\sigma h-1}, \\
0 &= -\lambda_0 0.5R^L \gamma/(qz) ((h - h_b)^{-\sigma h} - h_b^{-\sigma h}) + \lambda_8 2qz h_b/R^L, \\
0 &= -\lambda_2(n^\alpha/s^2) + \lambda_3(1 - \beta\phi\pi^\varepsilon) - \lambda_1(1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha)0.5^\eta n^{1+\eta-\alpha}(mcs)^{-1} \frac{\pi^{\varepsilon-1}\phi(1-\beta)(\pi-1)}{(1-\phi\beta\pi^{\varepsilon-1})(1-\phi\pi^\varepsilon)}, \\
0 &= \lambda_1 0.5(\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}) + \varepsilon\phi s\pi^\varepsilon(\pi - 1) \left(\lambda_1 \frac{(1-\tau^n)(\chi/\alpha)0.5^\eta n^{1+\eta-\alpha}(mcs)^{-1}}{(1-\phi\pi^\varepsilon)(1-\phi\beta\pi^{\varepsilon-1})} - \frac{\lambda_3}{1-\pi^{\varepsilon-1}\phi} \right), \\
0 &= 0.5\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} [1 + \lambda_0\sigma c_b^{-1} + \lambda_1\sigma c_b^{-1}/\pi] - \lambda_2 - \lambda_8, \\
0 &= 0.5\epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma} [1 - \lambda_0\sigma c_l^{-1} + \lambda_1\sigma c_l^{-1}/\pi] - \lambda_2 + \lambda_8, \\
0 &= -\chi 0.5^{1+\eta}n^\eta + \lambda_2(\alpha n^{\alpha-1}/s) + \lambda_1(1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha)0.5^\eta \frac{n^{\eta-\alpha}}{mc} \left(\frac{1-\phi\beta\pi^\varepsilon}{1-\phi\beta\pi^{\varepsilon-1}} \frac{1-\phi\pi^{\varepsilon-1}}{1-\phi\pi^\varepsilon} (1+\eta) - \alpha \right),
\end{aligned}$$

as well as the steady state versions of the constraints in (78): $c_l = (\frac{\epsilon_l}{n^{\eta+1-\alpha}} \frac{\omega mc}{R^L})^{1/\sigma}$, $1/R^L = \beta(c_l^\sigma/\epsilon_l)0.5(\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma})/\pi$, $\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} - \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma} = R^L(\gamma/qz)[(h - h_b)^{-\sigma h} - h_b^{-\sigma h}]$, $c_b - c_l = 2zqh_b/R^L$, $\frac{qn^{\eta+1-\alpha}}{mc}(1-\beta) = \gamma\omega(h - h_b)^{-\sigma h}$, $n^\alpha/s = c_l + c_b$, $s = (1-\phi)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)} \frac{(1-\phi\pi^{\varepsilon-1})^{\varepsilon/(\varepsilon-1)}}{1-\phi\pi^\varepsilon}$, and $mc = \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \frac{1-\phi\beta\pi^\varepsilon}{1-\phi\beta\pi^{\varepsilon-1}} (\frac{1-\phi}{1-\phi\pi^{\varepsilon-1}})^{1/(\varepsilon-1)}$.

Under flexible prices and perfect competition the policy problem simplifies to

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{\{c_{b,t}, c_{l,t}, n_t, \pi_t, h_{b,t}, q_t, R_t^L\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \min_{\{\lambda_{0,t}, \lambda_{1,t}, \lambda_{2,t}, \lambda_{8,t}, \lambda_{9,t}, \lambda_{10,t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \quad (79) \\
& E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[0.5\epsilon_b(c_{b,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1)(1-\sigma)^{-1} + 0.5\epsilon_l(c_{l,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1)(1-\sigma)^{-1} - \chi(0.5n_t)^{1+\eta}(1+\eta)^{-1} \right. \\
& \quad \left. + 0.5\gamma(h_{b,t}^{1-\sigma_h} - 1)(1-\sigma_h)^{-1} + 0.5\gamma((h-h_{b,t})^{1-\sigma_h} - 1)(1-\sigma_h)^{-1} \right], \\
& + \lambda_{0,t} \left[0.5\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} - 0.5\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + 0.5R_t^L (\gamma/(1+v)q_t z_t) ((h-h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h}) \right] \\
& + \lambda_{1,t} \left[(1-\tau^n) \chi 0.5^\eta n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} / a_t \alpha - \beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] \right] + \lambda_{2,t} [a_t n_t^\alpha - c_{l,t} - c_{b,t}] \\
& + \lambda_{8,t} [2((1+v)z_t q_t h_{b,t} / R_t^L) - c_{b,t} + c_{l,t}] + \lambda_{9,t} [\beta E_t [0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] - \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} / R_t^L] \\
& + \lambda_{10,t} [q_t n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} a_t^{-1} - \beta E_t (q_{t+1} n_{t+1}^{\eta+1-\alpha} a_{t+1}^{-1}) - \gamma \omega (h-h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h}]
\end{aligned}$$

such that the policy plan is – when neglecting conditions for $t = 0$ – characterized by the following first order conditions of the policy problem

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= 0.5\gamma h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h} - 0.5\gamma(h-h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} + \lambda_{0,t} 0.5R_t^L (\gamma/(1+v)q_t z_t) (\sigma_h(h-h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h-1} + \sigma_h h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h-1}) \\
& \quad + \lambda_{8,t} 2((1+v)z_t q_t / R_t^L) - \lambda_{10,t} \gamma \omega \sigma_h (h-h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h-1}, \\
0 &= \lambda_{0,t} 0.5(\gamma/(1+v)q_t z_t) ((h-h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h}) - \lambda_{8,t} 2(1+v)z_t q_t h_{b,t} (R_t^L)^{-2} + \lambda_{9,t} \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} (R_t^L)^{-2}, \\
0 &= \lambda_{9,t} \epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} (q_t R_t^L)^{-1} + n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} a_t^{-1} (\lambda_{10,t} - \lambda_{10,t-1}), \quad 0 = \lambda_{1,t} - \lambda_{9,t}, \\
0 &= -\chi 0.5^{1+\eta} n_t^\eta + (\lambda_{2,t} a_t \alpha n_t^{\alpha-1}) + ((\eta+1-\alpha) n_t^{\eta-\alpha} / a_t) [(\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta \lambda_{1,t} + q_t (\lambda_{10,t} - \lambda_{10,t-1})], \\
0 &= 0.5\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} (1 + \lambda_{0,t} \sigma c_{b,t}^{-1} + \lambda_{1,t-1} \sigma c_{b,t}^{-1} \pi_t^{-1} - \lambda_{9,t-1} \sigma c_{b,t}^{-1} / \pi_t) - \lambda_{2,t} - \lambda_{8,t}, \\
0 &= 0.5\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} (1 - \lambda_{0,t} \sigma c_{l,t}^{-1} + \lambda_{1,t-1} \sigma c_{l,t}^{-1} \pi_t^{-1} - \lambda_{9,t-1} \sigma c_{l,t}^{-1} \pi_t^{-1} + \lambda_{9,t} \sigma c_{l,t}^{-1} / R_t^L) - \lambda_{2,t} + \lambda_{8,t},
\end{aligned}$$

as well as the constraints to the policy problem (79), and the transversality conditions, given $\{a_t, z_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, $h > 0$, as well as as well as $\lambda_{1,-1} = \lambda_1$, $\lambda_{9,-1} = \lambda_9$ and $\lambda_{10,-1} = \lambda_{10}$. The steady state of the solution, where all variables are constant or grow with a constant rate, is a set $\{c_b, c_l, h_b, n, R^L, \pi, q, \lambda_0, \lambda_2, \lambda_8, \lambda_{10}\}$ satisfying

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= 0.5\gamma h_b^{-\sigma_h} - 0.5\gamma(h-h_b)^{-\sigma_h} + \lambda_0 0.5R^L (\gamma/(1+v)qz) (\sigma_h(h-h_b)^{-\sigma_h-1} + \sigma_h h_b^{-\sigma_h-1}) \\
& \quad + \lambda_8 2((1+v)zq/R^L) - \lambda_{10} \gamma \omega \sigma_h (h-h_b)^{-\sigma_h-1}, \\
0 &= -\lambda_0 0.5R^L (\gamma/(1+v)q^2z) ((h-h_b)^{-\sigma_h} - h_b^{-\sigma_h}) - \lambda_8 2(1+v)zh_b/R^L, \quad \chi 0.5^{1+\eta} n^\eta = \lambda_2 \alpha n^{\alpha-1}, \\
0 &= 0.5\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} (1 + \lambda_0 \sigma c_b^{-1}) - \lambda_2 - \lambda_8, \quad 0 = 0.5\epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma} (1 - \lambda_0 \sigma c_l^{-1}) - \lambda_2 + \lambda_8
\end{aligned}$$

as well as the steady state versions of the constraints in (79) $c_l = (\frac{\epsilon_l}{n^{\eta+1-\alpha}} \frac{\omega}{R^L})^{1/\sigma}$, $1/R^L = \beta (c_l^\sigma / \epsilon_l) 0.5(\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}) / \pi$, $\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} - \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma} = R^L (\gamma/qz) [(h-h_b)^{-\sigma_h} - h_b^{-\sigma_h}]$, $c_b - c_l = 2zqh_b/R^L$, $qn^{\eta+1-\alpha} (1-\beta) = \gamma \omega (h-h_b)^{-\sigma_h}$, and $n^\alpha = c_l + c_b$.

A.6 Optimal monetary policy under rationed money supply

In this Appendix, we consider the policy problem for the case where the central bank takes the possibility of money rationing into account. To identify the solution to the optimal policy problem we proceed as follows. We first set-up the policy problem including the money supply constraints (2) and (4). We then examine if the central bank is able to undo several constraints imposed by the private sector equilibrium behavior (see Definition 3) by using its instruments, R_t^m , κ_t , and κ_t^B . We thereby ignore further restrictions on these instruments, like $R_t^m \geq 1$ and $\kappa_t^{(B)} \in [0, 1]$. After solving for the optimal policy plan and the associated sequences for all instruments, we verify (numerically) that the restrictions on the policy instruments are not violated for the chosen set of parameter values and in the neighborhood of the long-run equilibrium. The policy problem can then be summarized as

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \max_{\{c_{b,t}, c_{l,t}, n_t, m_t^H, b_t, b_t^T, l_t, m c_t, \tilde{Z}_t, Z_{1,t}, Z_{2,t}, s_t, \pi_t, R_t^L, \kappa_t^B, \kappa_t, R_t^m, h_{b,t}, q_t\}_{t=0}^\infty} \min_{\{\theta_{1,t}, \dots, \theta_{16,t}\}_{t=0}^\infty} \quad (80) \\
 & E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[0.5 \epsilon_b (c_{b,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1) (1 - \sigma)^{-1} + 0.5 \epsilon_l (c_{l,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1) (1 - \sigma)^{-1} - \chi (0.5 n_t)^{1+\eta} (1 + \eta)^{-1} \right. \\
 & \quad \left. + 0.5 \gamma (h_{b,t}^{1-\sigma_h} - 1) (1 - \sigma_h)^{-1} + 0.5 \gamma ((h - h_{b,t})^{1-\sigma_h} - 1) (1 - \sigma_h)^{-1} \right] \\
 & + \theta_{1,t} \left[\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} / R_t^L - (1 - \tau^n) \chi (0.5 n_t)^\eta / (m c_t a_t \alpha n_t^{\alpha-1}) - \gamma ((1 + v) q_t z_t)^{-1} ((h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} - h_{b,t}^{-\sigma_h}) \right] \\
 & + \theta_{2,t} \left[(1 - \tau^n) \chi (0.5 n_t)^\eta / (m c_t a_t \alpha n_t^{\alpha-1}) - \beta E_t [0.5 (\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] \right] \\
 & + \theta_{3,t} \left[(1 / R_t^L) - \beta (c_{l,t}^\sigma / \epsilon_l) E_t [0.5 (\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_{t+1}] \{1 + [\kappa_t / (1 + v)] [(R_t^L / R_t^m) - 1]\} \right] \\
 & + \theta_{4,t} \left[0.5 (1 + \Omega_t) m_t^H + \{(1 + v) l_t / R_t^L\} + (\kappa_t l_t / R_t^m) - c_{b,t} \right] + \theta_{5,t} \left[b_t - b_t^T + m_t^H \right] \\
 & + \theta_{6,t} \left[0.5 (1 + \Omega_t) m_t^H - (1 + v) (l_t / R_t^L) - c_{l,t} \right] \\
 & + \theta_{7,t} \left[a_t n_t^\alpha / s_t - c_{l,t} - c_{b,t} \right] + \theta_{8,t} \left[\tilde{Z}_t (\varepsilon - 1) / \varepsilon - Z_{1,t} / Z_{2,t} \right] + \theta_{9,t} \left[(1 - \phi) (\tilde{Z}_t)^{1-\varepsilon} + \phi \pi_t^{\varepsilon-1} - 1 \right] \\
 & + \theta_{10,t} \left[s_t - (1 - \phi) \tilde{Z}_t^{-\varepsilon} - \phi s_{t-1} \pi_t^\varepsilon \right] + \theta_{11,t} \left[Z_{1,t} - (1 - \tau^n) (\chi / \alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} s_t^{-1} - \phi \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^\varepsilon Z_{1,t+1} \right] \\
 & + \theta_{12,t} \left[Z_{2,t} - (1 - \tau^n) (\chi / \alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} (m c_t s_t)^{-1} - \phi \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^{\varepsilon-1} Z_{2,t+1} \right] + \theta_{13,t} \left[b_t^T - \Gamma b_{t-1}^T / \pi_t \right] \\
 & + \theta_{14,t} \left[\kappa_t^B b_{t-1} / (R_t^m \pi_t) - (1 + \Omega_t) m_t^H + m_{t-1}^H \pi_t^{-1} \right] + \theta_{15,t} \left[z_t q_t h_{b,t} - l_t \right] \\
 & + \theta_{16,t} \left[q_t n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} / (m c_t a_t) - \beta E_t q_{t+1} n_{t+1}^{\eta+1-\alpha} / (m c_{t+1} a_{t+1}) - \varrho (h - h_{b,t})^{-\sigma_h} \right]
 \end{aligned}$$

We first examine the optimal choices for policy related variables and, in particular, for the monetary policy instruments. We thereby show that the set of relevant constraints of the original policy problem (80) can be reduced, if the central bank rations money supply. Once we have shown that several constraints in (80) are not binding, we continue with the simplified policy problem. The first order condition for κ_t^B , $\theta_{14,t} b_{t-1} / (R_t^m \pi_t) = 0$, immediately leads to $\theta_{14,t} = 0$, such that the first order conditions for b_t , $\theta_{5,t} + \beta E_t \theta_{14,t+1} \kappa_{t+1}^B / R_{t+1}^m \pi_{t+1} = 0$, and for b_t^T , $\theta_{5,t} = \theta_{13,t} - \Gamma \beta E_t \theta_{13,t+1} / \pi_{t+1}$, imply $\theta_{5,t} = 0$ and $\theta_{13,t} = 0$. Then, the first order condition for m_t^H ,

$\theta_{5,t} + \theta_{4,t}0.5(1 + \Omega_t) + \theta_{6,t}0.5(1 + \Omega_t) - (1 + \Omega_t)\theta_{14,t} + \beta E_t \theta_{14,t+1}/\pi_{t+1} = 0$, leads to $\theta_{4,t} = -\theta_{6,t}$.

The optimal choices for the policy rate R_t^m and κ_t depend on whether the policy rate is set below the loan rate or not. If $R_t^m = R_t^L$, the constraint (17) reduces to $(1/R_t^L) - \beta(c_{l,t}^\sigma/\epsilon_l)E_t[0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}]$ as in the case of non-rationed money supply (see Appendix A.5). Here, we consider the case where money supply rationing is induced by

$$R_t^m < R_t^L, \quad (81)$$

such that the first order condition for R_t^m is given by $\theta_{3,t}\beta(c_{l,t}^\sigma/\epsilon_l)E_t[0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}][\kappa_t/(1+v)]R_t^L = \theta_{4,t}\kappa_t l_t + \theta_{14,t}\kappa_t^B b_{t-1}\pi_t^{-1}$, which can by using $\theta_{14,t} = 0$ be further simplified to $\theta_{3,t}\beta(c_{l,t}^\sigma/\epsilon_l)E_t[0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}]/(1+v) = \theta_{4,t}l_t/R_t^L$. Combining the latter with the first order condition for κ_t , $-\theta_{3,t}\beta(c_{l,t}^\sigma/\epsilon_l)E_t[0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}][1/(1+v)][(R_t^L/R_t^m) - 1] + \theta_{4,t}(l_t/R_t^m) = 0$, then leads to $\theta_{4,t}l_t/R_t^L = 0$ and thus $\theta_{4,t} = 0$. The first order conditions for l_t , $\theta_{4,t}[(1+v)/R_t^L + (\kappa_t/R_t^m)] - \theta_{6,t}(1+v)/R_t^L - \theta_{15,t} = 0$, then implies $\theta_{15,t} = 0$. We can therefore conclude that the constraints associated with the multiplier $\theta_{3,t}$, $\theta_{4,t}$, $\theta_{5,t}$, $\theta_{6,t}$, $\theta_{13,t}$, $\theta_{14,t}$, and $\theta_{15,t}$, which are all equal to zero, are not binding for the policy choice. Then, the loan rate can be set to ensure that the constraint associated with the multiplier θ_{1t} is satisfied, while the constraint associated with the multiplier $\theta_{16,t}$ can be used to residually determine the sequence of q_t for a given allocation. When (81) is satisfied, the policy problem (80) can therefore be reduced to

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\{c_{b,t}, c_{l,t}, n_t, mc_t, \tilde{Z}_t, Z_{1,t}, Z_{2,t}, s_t, \pi_t, h_{b,t}\}_{t=0}^\infty} \min_{\{\lambda_{1,t}, \dots, \lambda_{7,t}\}_{t=0}^\infty} \quad (82) \\ & E \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \left[\begin{aligned} & 0.5\epsilon_b(c_{b,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1)(1-\sigma)^{-1} + 0.5\epsilon_l(c_{l,t}^{1-\sigma} - 1)(1-\sigma)^{-1} - \chi(0.5n_t)^{1+\eta}(1+\eta)^{-1} \\ & + 0.5\gamma(h_{b,t}^{1-\sigma_h} - 1)(1-\sigma_h)^{-1} + 0.5\gamma((h - h_{b,t})^{1-\sigma_h} - 1)(1-\sigma_h)^{-1} \end{aligned} \right], \\ & + \lambda_{1,t} \left[(1-\tau^n)\chi 0.5^\eta n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} / (mc_t a_t \alpha) - \beta E_t[0.5(\epsilon_b c_{b,t+1}^{-\sigma} + \epsilon_l c_{l,t+1}^{-\sigma})/\pi_{t+1}] \right] \\ & + \lambda_{2,t} [a_t n_t^\alpha / s_t - c_{l,t} - c_{b,t}] \\ & + \lambda_{3,t} \left[s_t - \phi s_{t-1} \pi_t^\varepsilon - (1-\phi)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} (1-\phi \pi_t^{\varepsilon-1})^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}} \right] \\ & + \lambda_{4,t} \left[(1-\phi)(\tilde{Z}_t)^{1-\varepsilon} + \phi \pi_t^{\varepsilon-1} - 1 \right] \\ & + \lambda_{5,t} \left[\tilde{Z}_t(\varepsilon-1)/\varepsilon - Z_{1,t}/Z_{2,t} \right] \\ & + \lambda_{6,t} \left[Z_{1,t} - (1-\tau^n)(\chi/\alpha)0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} s_t^{-1} - \phi \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^\varepsilon Z_{1,t+1} \right] \\ & + \lambda_{7,t} \left[Z_{2,t} - (1-\tau^n)(\chi/\alpha)0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} (mc_t s_t)^{-1} - \phi \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^{\varepsilon-1} Z_{2,t+1} \right] \end{aligned}$$

Neglecting the conditions for $t = 0$, the solution to the policy problem (82) has to satisfy the

following first order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= h_{b,t} - 0.5h \\
0 &= 0.5\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + \lambda_{1,t-1}\epsilon_b 0.5\sigma \left(c_{b,t}^{-\sigma-1}/\pi_t \right) - \lambda_{2,t}, \\
0 &= 0.5\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma} + \lambda_{1,t-1}\epsilon_l 0.5\sigma \left(c_{l,t}^{-\sigma-1}/\pi_t \right) - \lambda_{2,t}, \\
0 &= -\chi 0.5^{1+\eta} n_t^\eta + [\lambda_{1,t}(\eta + 1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau^n) \chi 0.5^\eta n_t^{\eta-\alpha} / (mc_t \alpha a_t)] + (\lambda_{2,t} a_t \alpha n_t^{\alpha-1} / s_t) \\
&\quad - \lambda_{6,t}(1 + \eta)(1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^\eta s_t^{-1} - \lambda_{7,t}(1 + \eta)(1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^\eta (mc_t s_t)^{-1}, \\
0 &= [\lambda_{1,t-1} (0.5\epsilon_b c_{b,t}^{-\sigma} + 0.5\epsilon_l c_{l,t}^{-\sigma}) / \pi_t^2] + \lambda_{4,t}(\varepsilon - 1) \phi \pi_t^{\varepsilon-2} \\
&\quad - \lambda_{6,t-1} \phi \varepsilon \pi_t^{\varepsilon-1} Z_{1,t} - \lambda_{7,t-1} \phi (\varepsilon - 1) \pi_t^{\varepsilon-2} Z_{2,t} \\
&\quad + \lambda_{3,t} \left[-\phi s_{t-1} \varepsilon \pi_t^{\varepsilon-1} - (1 - \phi)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} (1 - \phi \pi_t^{\varepsilon-1})^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}-1} (-(\varepsilon - 1) \phi \pi_t^{\varepsilon-2}) \right], \\
0 &= -(\lambda_{2,t} a_t n_t^\alpha / s_t^2) + \lambda_{3,t} - \beta E_t \lambda_{3,t+1} \phi \pi_{t+1}^\varepsilon \\
&\quad + \lambda_{6,t}(1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} s_t^{-2} + \lambda_{7,t}(1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} mc_t^{-1} s_t^{-2}, \\
&\quad - [\lambda_{1,t}(1 - \tau^n) \chi 0.5^\eta n_t^{\eta+1-\alpha} / (mc_t^2 \alpha a_t)] + \lambda_{7,t} \mu_t (1 - \tau^n)(\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n_t^{1+\eta} mc_t^{-2} s_t^{-1}, \\
0 &= -(\lambda_{5,t} / Z_{2,t}) + \lambda_{6,t} - \lambda_{6,t-1} \phi \pi_t^\varepsilon, \\
0 &= \lambda_{5,t}(Z_{1,t} / Z_{2,t}^2) + \lambda_{7,t} - \lambda_{7,t-1} \phi \pi_t^{\varepsilon-1}, \\
0 &= \lambda_{4,t}(1 - \phi)(1 - \varepsilon)(\tilde{Z}_t)^{-\varepsilon} + \lambda_{5,t}(\varepsilon - 1) / \varepsilon,
\end{aligned}$$


as well as the constraints to the policy problem (82), and the transversality conditions, given τ^n , $\{a_t, z_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$, $h > 0$, $s_{-1} = 1$, as well as $\theta_{1,-1} = \theta_1$, $\theta_{6,-1} = \theta_6$, and $\theta_{7,-1} = \theta_7$. The steady state of the solution, where all exogenous and endogenous variables are constant or grow with a constant rate, can be reduced to a set $\{c_b, c_l, n, \pi, s, \lambda_1, \lambda_3, h_b\}$ satisfying

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= \epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma} (1 + \sigma c_l^{-1} \lambda_1 / \pi) - \epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} (1 + \sigma c_b^{-1} \lambda_1 / \pi), \\
0 &= \frac{\pi}{\beta} 0.5 (1 + \sigma c_b^{-1} \lambda_1 / \pi) (\alpha n^\alpha / s) + \lambda_1 \frac{0.5\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + 0.5\epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}}{\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma}} (\eta + 1 - \alpha + (1 + \eta) \Phi(\pi)) \\
&\quad - \frac{\chi n^{1+\eta} 0.5^{1+\eta} \pi}{\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} \beta}, \quad \text{where } \Phi(\pi) = \frac{1 - \phi \beta \pi^\varepsilon}{1 - \phi \beta \pi^{\varepsilon-1}} \frac{1 - \phi \pi^{\varepsilon-1}}{1 - \phi \pi^\varepsilon} - 1. \\
0 &= \lambda_1 \frac{0.5\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + 0.5\epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}}{\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma}} \Phi(\pi) + \frac{\pi}{\beta} 0.5 (1 + \sigma c_b^{-1} \lambda_1 / \pi) (n^\alpha / s) - \frac{\pi}{\beta} s \lambda_3 \frac{c_b^\sigma}{\epsilon_b} (1 - \beta \phi \pi^\varepsilon), \\
0 &= -\lambda_1 + \lambda_3 \phi \varepsilon \pi^\varepsilon \frac{s}{0.5\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + 0.5\epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}} \frac{\pi - 1}{1 - \phi \pi^{\varepsilon-1}} + \lambda_1 \beta \frac{\varepsilon \phi \pi^{\varepsilon-1}}{1 - \phi \beta \pi^{\varepsilon-1}} \frac{1 - \pi}{1 - \phi \pi^\varepsilon}, \\
0 &= (1 - \tau^n) \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \frac{\pi}{\beta} \left(\frac{1 - \phi \pi^{\varepsilon-1}}{1 - \phi} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}} \frac{(1 - \phi \beta \pi^{\varepsilon-1})}{(1 - \phi \beta \pi^\varepsilon)} - \frac{0.5\epsilon_b c_b^{-\sigma} + 0.5\epsilon_l c_l^{-\sigma}}{(\chi/\alpha) 0.5^\eta n^{\eta+1-\alpha}}, \\
0 &= (1 - \phi)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} \frac{(1 - \phi \pi^{\varepsilon-1})^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}}{(1 - \phi \pi^\varepsilon)} - s, \quad 0 = c_l + c_b - n^\alpha / s, \quad h_b = 0.5h.
\end{aligned}$$


A.7 Parameter values

Subjective discount factor	$\beta = 0.99$	Share of unsecured loans	$v = 0.5$
Inverse int. elasticity of substitution	$\sigma(h) = 2$	Utility weight on housing	$\gamma = 0.1$
Inverse of Frisch elasticity	$\eta = 1$	Utility weight on working time	$\chi = 98$
Substitution elasticity	$\varepsilon = 10$	Housing supply	$h = 28$
Degree of price stickiness	$\phi = 0.7$	Stochastic consumption weights	$\Delta\epsilon = 1$
Labor income share	$\alpha = 0.66$	Mean liquidation share of collateral	$z = 0.8$
Autocorrelation of shocks	$\rho_{a,z} = 0.9$	Standard deviation of shocks	$sd_{a,z} = 0.005$

A.8 Additional figures



Responses to a contractionary productivity shock under optimal policy w/o m. rationing



Responses to a lower liquidation value under optimal policy w/o m. rationing